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In 2011, President Barack Obama announced a national strategy for countering violent extremism (CVE)
to attempt to prevent the “radicalization” of potential violent extremists. The Obama Administration
intended the strategy to employ a community-based approach, bringing together the government, law
enforcement, and local communities for CVE efforts. Despite claiming to target extremism in all forms,
government-funded CVE programs in the United States have almost exclusively focused on Islamic
extremism. One pilot program focused on the Twin Cities in Minnesota—Minneapolis and St. Paul—home
to the largest Somali community in the United States, most of whom are Muslim. The Trump
Administration has rebranded and refunded the programs, exacerbating ongoing racial discrimination,
surveillance, and police brutality in the Twin Cities. Despite their continued use, CVE programs draw
criticism for being ineffective and even counterproductive to preventing extremist violence and for driving
increased marginalization of American Muslims.
This Comment argues that, as implemented, government-funded CVE programs in the Twin Cities violate
American Muslims’ Equal Protection rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, CVE
programs impermissibly target Somalis on the basis of national origin and religion, and many of these
programs are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster. To effectively and
constitutionally prevent violent extremism, the U.S. government must allow communities to meaningfully
identify and address their own needs and potential vulnerabilities, without being subjected to heightened
surveillance and marginalization.
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In 2011, President Barack Obama announced a national strategy for
countering violent extremism (CVE) to attempt to prevent the “radicalization”
of potential violent extremists. The Obama Administration intended the strategy
to employ a community-based approach, bringing together the government, law
enforcement, and local communities for CVE efforts. Despite claiming to target
extremism in all forms, government-funded CVE programs in the United States
have almost exclusively focused on Islamic extremism. One pilot program focused
on the Twin Cities in Minnesota—Minneapolis and St. Paul—home to the
largest Somali community in the United States, most of whom are Muslim. The
Trump Administration has rebranded and refunded the programs, exacerbating
ongoing racial discrimination, surveillance, and police brutality in the Twin
Cities. Despite their continued use, CVE programs draw criticism for being
ineffective and even counterproductive to preventing extremist violence and for
driving increased marginalization of American Muslims.
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This Comment argues that, as implemented, government-funded CVE
programs in the Twin Cities violate American Muslims’ Equal Protection rights
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, CVE programs
impermissibly target Somalis on the basis of national origin and religion, and many
of these programs are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster.
To effectively and constitutionally prevent violent extremism, the U.S. government
must allow communities to meaningfully identify and address their own needs and
potential vulnerabilities, without being subjected to heightened surveillance and
marginalization.
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INTRODUCTION
“History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency,
when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure . . . . [W]hen we
allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived
exigency, we invariably come to regret it.”
—Justice Thurgood Marshall1
Over the course of the nearly two decades since the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has taken measures abroad
to attempt to prevent future attacks and quash extremist movements
overseas that might threaten U.S. national security. The government
has also turned its eye inward, looking to prevent similar threats that
could be present within U.S. borders. In the years following the
declaration of the “War on Terror,”2 the government sought to understand
1. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
2. President George W. Bush first used the term “war on terror” in an address to
Congress on September 20, 2001. See Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress
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what motivated a person to become a terrorist and how that person
could be identified.3
In 2011, this effort manifested as countering violent extremism
(CVE),4 a strategy referring to actions that seek to prevent and counter
the recruitment and radicalization of potential violent extremists.5
CVE initiatives were designed to be the “soft” approach complementing
“hard” counterterrorism activities, such as “anti-terrorism surveillance,
prosecution, and convictions.”6 CVE policing strategies and tactics
focus on preventing the “root causes” of radicalization of potential
extremists and providing “off-ramps” for individuals in the process of
becoming radicalized.7 The Obama Administration stated that CVE
programs would employ a “community-based approach,” and bring
together government, law enforcement, and local communities to prevent
violent extremism and radicalization.8 The White House’s plan envisioned
the involvement of federal law enforcement and national security
agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National

of the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks on September 11, PUB. PAPERS
1140, 1142–43 (Sept. 20, 2001) (“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does
not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been
found, stopped and defeated.”).
3. See, e.g., infra note 42 and accompanying text.
4. The Trump Administration has transitioned away from the Obama-era term
CVE to “terrorism prevention.” See BRIAN A. JACKSON ET AL., PRACTICAL TERRORISM
PREVENTION: APPENDIXES 5 (2019), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
research_reports/RR2600/RR2647/RAND_RR2647z1.appendixes.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HD4C-3FAM]. This Comment uses the term “CVE” because the
majority of the programs it examines have their roots in the original CVE framework.
5. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR
EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES
1–2 (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2016_strategic_
implementation_plan_empowering_local_partners_prev.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N5QX-WZP4] [hereinafter 2016 STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN] (describing violent extremism as a “persistent and dangerous problem in the
United States [for which] single instances can have far-reaching consequences”).
6. Sahar F. Aziz, Losing the “War of Ideas:” A Critique of Countering Violent Extremism
Programs, 52 TEX. INT’L L.J. 255, 258 (2017).
7. George Selim, Approaches for Countering Violent Extremism at Home and Abroad,
668 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 94, 95 (2016).
8. WHITE HOUSE, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM
IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2011), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications
/empowering_local_partners.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y5F6-9XQX]
[hereinafter
EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS].
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Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Department of Justice (DOJ), and
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).9
While the initial strategy for CVE claimed to target violent extremism
in all forms, it quickly became clear that its main focus was Islamic
extremism.10 This focus was magnified when federal government CVE
initiatives spread to Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota (referred to
colloquially as “the Twin Cities”), home to the largest Somali
community in the United States, most of whom are Muslim.11
Beginning in 2007, a couple dozen Somalis left the Twin Cities to fight
overseas with terrorist organizations.12 The U.S. government stepped in
with its CVE pilot program to build “resilience” to recruitment in the
community through forging relationships with law enforcement and
creating frameworks for “intervention[s]” for at-risk individuals.13 Led
by the U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, the program involves
local law enforcement, the FBI, DHS, and local schools participating
in various “community engagement” activities.14 The initiatives sought
to monitor the Somali diaspora community residing in the Twin Cities,
due to fears that the community may become radicalized.15 And while
it initially seemed as though the programs would wind down under the
Trump Administration,16 the Department of Homeland Security
announced in 2020 that it would be implementing a strategy and
administering a grant program similar to the CVE programs designed
under the Obama administration.17
However, radicalization theory and CVE efforts are often criticized
as being ineffective and even counterproductive to preventing extremist

9. WHITE HOUSE, STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL
PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES 3–4 (2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YYS3-EV3N] [hereinafter 2011 STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN].
10. See infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 89 and accompanying text; see also STEFANIE CHAMBERS, SOMALIS
IN THE TWIN CITIES AND COLUMBUS: IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION IN NEW DESTINATIONS
57, 81 (2017).
12. See infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
13. U.S. ATT’Y’S OFFICE IN THE DIST. OF MINN., BUILDING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE
MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL PILOT PROGRAM: A COMMUNITY-LED LOCAL FRAMEWORK 4–5
(2015) [hereinafter BUILDING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE].
14. See infra Section I.A.2.
15. See infra Section I.A.2.
16. See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 74–85 and accompanying text.
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violence,18 especially in a time when right-wing extremists, not Islamic
extremists, perpetuate the vast majority of domestic terrorist attacks in
the United States.19 Furthermore, the programs perpetuate and
legitimize Islamophobia in the United States by designating American
Muslims as a community that is inherently suspect and tied to criminality.20
While the government might have had good intentions in creating
CVE initiatives in the Twin Cities, this Comment argues that, as
implemented, the programs violate American Muslims’ Equal Protection
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, this
Comment examines the ways that CVE programs impermissibly target
Somalis on the basis of national origin and religion and demonstrates
that many of these programs are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to be
constitutional.
Part I details the creation of CVE programs across the United States
and how different federal agencies have implemented the CVE
framework. This Part explains how CVE functions in the Twin Cities
and the programs’ effects on Minnesotan Somalis. Further, this Part
describes criticisms of CVE related to its efficacy and its harmful effects
on American Muslims. Part I also describes the framework of Equal
Protection jurisprudence and examines in particular how it applies to
religious discrimination. Part II analyzes CVE programs in the Twin
Cities under the Equal Protection framework laid out in Part I. This
Part illustrates how the U.S. government impermissibly classifies
Somalis in the Twin Cities on the basis of their national origin and
religion. Finally, this Part concludes that CVE programs, as implemented,
are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s
interest in countering violent extremism.
The purpose of this Comment is not to criticize CVE or its
proponents and implementers in their entirety. Rather, it seeks to call
attention to the ways in which CVE programs, as currently implemented,
are problematic. This Comment further aims to critique the programs
from a lens of constitutionality, specifically under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its incorporation into the
Fifth Amendment, with the goal of ensuring that the civil liberties and
human dignity of American Muslims are guarded in the United States’
pursuit of preventing extremist violence.

18. See infra notes 132, 135–45 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 146–51 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 152–76 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND

Since their inception in 2011, CVE programs in the United States
have posed a threat to the Equal Protection rights of American Muslims.
Section A explains the creation of CVE programs in the United States,
their spread to the Twin Cities, and critiques of the programs. Section
B details the elements of an Equal Protection claim and explores the
jurisprudence behind the framework’s applicability to religious
identities.
A.

Countering Violent Extremism

The definition of CVE is incredibly broad.21 CVE refers to preventative
actions taken to counter the recruitment, “radicalization,” and
mobilization of potential violent extremists.22 Generally, CVE is
presented as the “softer” alternative to “hard” counterterrorism and
policing tactics, which include surveillance and criminal prosecution.23
“Hard” or more traditional counterterrorism seeks to neutralize
individuals who have taken active steps to commit a terrorist act or join
a terrorist organization.24 CVE, on the other hand, targets the
ideological recruitment of potential extremists, attempting to focus on
and prevent the “root causes” of radicalization and provide “off-ramps”
for individuals heading down a path toward potentially committing
terrorist acts.25 The federal government has struggled to demonstrate
that the United States is any safer since the implementation of these

21. See Selim, supra note 7, at 95–96 (noting that there are multiple definitions of
CVE, but that they generally lay out “noncoercive, nonkinetic, and . . . voluntary
activities”); Fact Sheet: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, WHITE
HOUSE 2 (Feb. 18, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism
[https://perma.cc/P7WB-XGCC](“CVE encompasses the preventative aspects of
counterterrorism as well as interventions to undermine the attraction of extremist
movements and ideologies . . . [and] address[es] the root causes of extremism
through community engagement.”).
22. See 2016 STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 5, at 1 n.2, 2 (defining
violent extremists as “individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated
violence to further political goals”).
23. See Aziz, supra note 6, at 258 (explaining that the concept of CVE accepts that
programs will be targeted “based on . . . communities’ common identities with
perpetrators of terrorism”).
24. See Selim, supra note 7, at 95–96 (“‘[C]ounterterrorism’ implies countering an
individual who, in the eyes of the law, has already taken steps toward committing a
terrorist act or joining a terrorist group.”).
25. Id.
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programs.26 Nevertheless, CVE has become a significant part of the policy
discourse27 and has had ramifications in American Muslim communities
across the country.
1.

CVE in the United States
In August 2011, President Barack Obama announced a strategy
entitled “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in
the United States.”28 The strategy represented the inception of CVE in
the United States and aimed to “prevent violent extremists . . . from
inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups
in the United States to commit acts of violence.”29 The strategy stated
that government agencies, law enforcement, and communities should
work together and use a “community-based approach” to prevent
violent extremism and radicalization.30 When it announced the strategy,
the Obama Administration claimed not to target American Muslim
communities, but rather to target violent extremism in all forms.31
However, the White House’s Strategic Implementation Plan released
a few months later said the government would prioritize preventing
violent extremism inspired by al-Qaeda and its affiliates.32 The plan

26. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-300, COUNTERING VIOLENT
EXTREMISM: ACTIONS NEEDED TO DEFINE STRATEGY AND ASSESS PROGRESS OF FEDERAL
EFFORTS 16 (2017) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (stating that the U.S. government’s lack
of a “cohesive strategy” for CVE efforts made it impossible for the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to determine “if the United States is better off today”
than when the efforts began); see also Emmanuel Mauleón, It’s Time to Put CVE to Bed,
JUST SECURITY (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/61332/its-time-put-cvebed [https://perma.cc/ZW78-M2S4] (arguing that the lack of a consistent definition
of CVE makes it impossible to measure the effectiveness of CVE programs).
27. See generally ARUN KUNDNANI & BEN HAYES, THE GLOBALIZATION OF COUNTERING
VIOLENT EXTREMISM POLICIES (2018), https://www.tni.org/files/publicationdownloads/the_globalisation_of_countering_violent_extremism_policies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5WBZ-P842] (detailing the rise of “violent extremism” and
“radicalization” in policy discourses in the United States and its subsequent
international proliferation); Benjamin K. Smith et al., Discourses on Countering Violent
Extremism: The Strategic Interplay Between Fear and Security After 9/11, 12 CRITICAL STUD.
ON TERRORISM 151 (2019) (describing the effect of CVE-related discourse on the
public’s perception of security).
28. See generally EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 8.
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id. at 2–3.
31. Id.
32. 2011 STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 9, at 2; see also JEROME P.
BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42553, COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE

2020]

CVE AND CONSITUTIONALITY IN THE TWIN CITIES

1997

outlined CVE actions built around three core goals: “(1) enhancing
engagement with and support to local communities that may be
targeted by violent extremists; (2) building government and law
enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism; and (3)
countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals.”33
The plan envisioned the involvement of national security and federal
law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, NCTC, DOJ, and DHS,
and numerous other federal agencies, including the Department of
Health and Human Services and the Department of Education.34
Additionally, the plan charged U.S. Attorneys with leading these
federal initiatives in their respective districts by discussing issues
related to CVE and counterterrorism with local communities, raising
awareness about violent extremism, and facilitating CVE partnerships
between federal government agencies and local communities.35
The White House released an updated plan in 2016.36 The new plan
stated that while progress had been made, violent extremist threats had
“continued to evolve,” and it sought to respond to the more current
“dynamics” of extremists.37 It included continued involvement from
U.S. Attorneys,38 the FBI, NCTC, DOJ, DHS, and local law enforcement,39
despite its assertion that “CVE efforts do not include gathering
intelligence or performing investigations for the purpose of criminal
prosecution.”40
Even before the introduction of the White House’s first CVE
Strategic Implementation Plan in 2011, the FBI had developed a

UNITED STATES 4 (2014) (“[T]he radicalization of violent jihadists falls under [the
Administration’s] purview and is the key focus.”).
33. 2011 STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 9, at 2.
34. Id. at 3–4.
35. Id. at 8.
36. 2016 STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 5.
37. Id. at 1. The Plan suggests that the updated version is needed to respond to
extremists’ ability to recruit people from long distances and encourage them to carry
out attacks from afar. Id. The plan expresses particular concern with extremists’ use of
the internet and social media as means of recruitment. Id.
38. Id. at 7–8. United States Attorneys are “the nation’s principal litigators” and
have the primary responsibility of prosecuting federal criminal cases. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 547 (2018); Mission, OFF. U.S. ATT’Y, https://www.justice.gov/usao/mission
[https://perma.cc/2VVF-2XF8].
39. 2016 STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 5, at 2, 7, 9, 11.
40. Id. at 2. But cf. BJELOPERA, supra note 32, at 4 (“Community engagement is—in
part—an effort to make law enforcement authority more accepted within localities.”).
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preventative framework to counter “violent Islamic extremism.”41 The
FBI’s approach included identifying “early indicators of those who
demonstrate the potential for violence” and engaging in outreach to
Muslim communities.42 It also laid out a four-stage “radicalization”
process: “preradicalization, identification, indoctrination, and action.”43
The FBI additionally compiled a list of “indicators” that could show
that an individual was being radicalized, including “[w]earing traditional
Muslim attire,” “[g]rowing facial hair,” “[f]requent attendance at a
mosque or a prayer group,” “[t]ravel to a Muslim country,” and
“[i]ncreased activity in a pro-Muslim social group or political cause.”44
More recently, the FBI has posited that it is attempting to counter all
forms of domestic extremism, not just “radical Islam.”45
Various FBI initiatives implemented under the guise of CVE have
raised concerns of inappropriate involvement between law enforcement
and social services and community members, as well as other harmful
41. Carol Dyer et al., Countering Violent Islamic Extremism, 76 FBI L. ENF’T BULL. 3, 3
(2007) (emphasis added), https://leb.fbi.gov/file-repository/archives/dec07leb.pdf/
view [https://perma.cc/45WW-76MC].
42. Id. at 4.
43. Id. This four-stage process mirrors the controversial approach laid out by the
New York Police Department (NYPD) in a lengthy 2007 report. See generally MITCHELL
D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE
HOMEGROWN THREAT 19 (2007), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
legacy/Justice/20070816.NYPD.Radicalization.in.the.West.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7NL7-9MKR]. The report focuses exclusively on Muslims and cites
only a handful of anecdotal cases to support its conclusions about radicalization. See
Amna Akbar, Policing “Radicalization,” 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 809, 834 (2013) (counting
eleven total cited cases, only five of which are American). The report states that
“[e]nclaves of ethnic populations that are largely Muslim” can be the breeding
grounds of radicalization. SILBER & BHATT, supra, at 22. It lists possible indicators of
radicalization, including broad expressions of Muslim identity like growing a beard,
and, even more absurdly, broad factors such as “[b]ecoming involved in social activism
and community issues.” Id. at 31. A settlement of a suit brought by the American Civil
Liberties Union against NYPD forced the Department to remove the report from its
website in 2016. FAIZA PATEL & MEGHAN KOUSHIK, COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 10–
11 (2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Bre
nnan%20Center%20CVE%20Report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/46ST-89SS].
44. FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS: FROM CONVERSION
TO JIHAD 10 (2006), https://cryptome.org/fbi-jihad.pdf [https://perma.cc/NL6H4NE3].
45. See, e.g., FBI, PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN SCHOOLS 5 (2016),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/Preventing-ViolentExtremism-in-Schools.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8QQ-2ND2] (recognizing “white
supremacists, animal rights and eco-terrorists, and anti-government or radical separatist
groups” as domestic violent extremist ideologies).
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consequences of the initiatives. For example, in 2016, the FBI
launched “Don’t Be a Puppet: Pull Back the Curtain on Violent
Extremism,” an online game aimed to educate youth and students
about the “destructive nature of violent extremism.”46 Teachers and
civil rights organizations expressed concern about the game.47 The
American Federation of Teachers wrote to the FBI stating they were
“deeply troubled” by the game and that it would “exacerbate the
bullying and profiling of Middle Eastern and Muslim students by
creating a culture of animosity and distrust.”48
Additionally, the FBI started “beta-testing” “Shared Responsibility
Committees” (SRCs), committees of local community and religious
leaders, mental health professionals, and teachers to which the FBI
would refer potentially violent extremists for “interventions.”49
However, the FBI did not specify the criteria it used to identify an
individual for investigation or what practices it would use to further an
investigation.50 Furthermore, the Committees posed significant privacy
concerns: the FBI could use notes taken by Committees’ religious leaders
and mental health professionals that would normally be protected
under various legal privileges, and Committee members could be
subpoenaed for suspects’ trials and civilly liable for the actions of the
persons under their care.51 Finally, despite the agency’s stating publicly
that the FBI would not use its CVE programs to surveil American
Muslims, a declassified internal communication stated plainly that CVE

46. Don’t Be a Puppet: Pull Back the Curtain on Violent Extremism, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/cve508 [https://perma.cc/6Q8K-9GVX].
47. Letter from the Am. Fed’n of Teachers, to James B. Comey, Dir., FBI (Aug. 9,
2016), https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/ltr_dont_be_a_puppet_aug2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YM4B-EGAU].
48. Id.
49. Arjun Singh Sethi, The FBI Needs to Stop Spying on Muslim-Americans, POLITICO
(Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/muslimamerican-surveillance-fbi-spying-213773
[https://perma.cc/EKH7-2VJQ];
Draft
Letter from FBI to Members of SRC, https://www.documentcloud.org/docu
ments/2815794-FBI-SRC-Letter.html; see also Cora Currier & Murtaza Hussain, Letter
Details FBI Plan for Secretive Anti-Radicalization Committees, INTERCEPT (Apr. 28, 2016),
https://theintercept.com/2016/04/28/letter-details-fbi-plan-for-secretive-antiradicalization-committees [https://perma.cc/LS7U-KVJQ].
50. See Sethi, supra note 49 (arguing that the Committees are “an effort to expand
and entrench the FBI’s growing network of confidential informants in the MuslimAmerican community”).
51. Id.
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initiatives strengthen the FBI’s investigative and intelligence gathering
capabilities.52
Following the implementation of many of the FBI’s policies, an
NCTC CVE guide was leaked to the public in 2015.53 The guide raised
concerns because it instructed law enforcement, public health workers,
teachers, and social workers to rate the individuals and families they
worked with on five-point scales of “risk factors.”54 While the risk factors
for individuals include plausibly reliable indicators such as committing
violence or talking of harming oneself or others, they also include
more problematic categories such as “connection to group identity
(race, nationality, religion, ethnicity),” “family connection to identity
group (race, nationality, religion, ethnicity),” and “family involvement
in community cultural and religious activities.”55 Based on these scores,
law enforcement, teachers, and social service providers are advised to
determine risk levels for radicalization and make plans for provision of
“services” and “interventions.”56 The guide does not indicate where
these ratings would be documented, what “interventions” would entail,
or what measures would be put in place to protect individuals’ civil
liberties and privacy.57 Despite the White House’s insistence that CVE
efforts do not target any specific group,58 the NCTC’s guide exclusively
cites examples based on Muslim communities.59

52. FBI, OFFICE OF PARTNER ENGAGEMENT, ASAC CONFERENCE—COUNTERING
VIOLENT EXTREMISM TRAINING (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/9D189AFA9E878DF18145FA7D70DE4A5B36CFB1E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A3P3-3M4Z].
53. Murtaza Hussain et al., Is Your Child a Terrorist? U.S. Government Questionnaire
Rates Families at Risk for Extremism, INTERCEPT (Feb. 9, 2015), https://theintercept
.com/2015/02/09/government-develops-questionnaire-see-might-become-terrorist
[https://perma.cc/FW2N-987B].
54. See NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: A GUIDE
FOR PRACTITIONERS AND ANALYSIS 18–22 (May 2014), https://www.document
cloud.org/documents/1657824-cve-guide.html [hereinafter CVE GUIDE] (defining
“risk factors” as “characteristics or experiences that increase susceptibility to engage in
violent extremism”).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 26; see also Hussain et al., supra note 53.
57. See generally CVE GUIDE, supra note 54.
58. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text (explaining that the strategy
claimed to target violent extremism in all forms and that the government would
prioritize preventing violent extremism inspired by al-Qaeda and its affiliates).
59. See CVE GUIDE, supra note 54 (citing interventions in the Somali community in
Lewiston, Maine, the Saudi Arabian violent extremist rehabilitation program, and
Singapore’s violent extremist rehabilitation program for Muslims).
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DHS has also played a significant role in implementing CVE
domestically. DHS’s 2016 “Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism”
claimed that “[v]iolent extremists have many motivations and are not
limited to any single population, region, or ideology.”60 Yet, just a month
before, DHS’s Office for Community Partnerships Director produced
written testimony titled “Identifying the Enemy: Radical Islamist Terror.”61
In the testimony, the Director described CVE as a “key focus of DHS’s
work to secure the homeland,” and stated that American Muslims are
the most likely to be targeted by extremist groups and are “best placed
to identify potential indicators of ISIL-inspired attacks.”62
In 2016, Congress allocated $10 million to DHS to launch a CVE
Grant Program, calling for applications from states, local governments,
and non-profits in the United States to implement CVE activities.63
Applicants were invited to apply for funding for projects focused on
“developing resilience,” “training and engaging with community
members,” and “managing intervention activities.”64 In the last remaining
weeks of the Obama Administration, DHS announced thirty-one
grantees, including law enforcement, academic institutions, and nonprofits, that would be receiving funds for CVE activities.65
Once President Donald Trump took office in January 2017, U.S. CVE
policy shifted significantly. In early 2017, the Trump Administration floated
the idea of changing the name of the “Countering Violent Extremism”
program to “Countering Islamic Extremism” or “Countering Radical
Islam.”66 A few months later, the Administration froze the funds that
60. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY FOR
COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 2 (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/16_1028_S1_CVE_strategy_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/MAX8-TEC6]
[hereinafter DHS STRATEGY] (emphasis added).
61. Identifying the Enemy: Radical Islamist Terror: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Mgmt. Efficiency of the Comm. on Homeland Sec., 114th Cong. 15–19 (2016)
[hereinafter Identifying the Enemy] (statement of George Selim, Director, Office of
Community Partnerships, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
62. Id.
63. Fact Sheet: FY 2016 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Grants, DEP’T HOMELAND
SECURITY (July 6, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/07/06/fy-2016-counteringviolent-extremism-cve-grants [https://perma.cc/RXT9-K47B].
64. Id.
65. Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson Announcing First Round of DHS’s Countering
Violent Extremism Grants, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Jan. 13, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/13/statement-secretary-jeh-johnsonannouncing-first-round-dhss-countering-violent [https://perma.cc/KF5T-AKX6].
66. Julia Edwards Ainsley et al., Trump to Focus Counter-Extremism Program Solely on Islam,
REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-extremists-
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were initially awarded to the thirty-one organizations under President
Obama.67 In June 2017, DHS awarded the funds to a revised list of
twenty-six different grantees,68 most notably excluding Life After Hate,
an organization focused on right-wing and white supremacist
violence.69 The vast majority of the twenty-six grantees that DHS selected
target American Muslims and, through the changes, the Administration
tripled the amount of CVE funding going to law enforcement.70
However, multiple grantees, predominately non-profits, declined the

program-exclusiv-idUSKBN15G5VO. While the name changes never took place, the
Trump Administration redirected resources confronting all forms of “domestic
extremism” to focus on Islamist extremism. See Vera Bergengruen & W.J. Hennigan,
‘We Are Being Eaten from Within.’ Why America Is Losing the Battle Against White Nationalist
Terrorism, TIME (Aug. 8, 2019), https://time.com/magazine/us/5647302/august19th-2019-vol-194-no-6-u-s (explaining the Trump Administration’s reallocation of
resources away from combatting white, nationalist extremism).
67. Julia Edwards Ainsley, White House Budget Slashes “Countering Violent Extremism”
Grants, REUTERS (May 23, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-budgetextremism-idUSKBN18J2HJ.
68. DHS Countering Violent Extremism Grants, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY,
https://www.dhs.gov/cvegrants [https://perma.cc/8LP2-AYZ9]. To access the
grantees’ project proposals in full, visit Countering Violent Extremism Grant Applications
(Awarded), DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/publication/cve-grantsawarded [https://perma.cc/NX9H-8RG7].
69. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, DHS Strips Funding from Group that Counters Neo-Nazi
Violence, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 26, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/26/dhsstrips-funding-from-group-that-counters-neo-nazi-violence [https://perma.cc/5MXVNEJ4].
70. Faiza Patel et al., Countering Violent Extremism in the Trump Era, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST. (June 15, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/researchreports/countering-violent-extremism-trump-era [https://perma.cc/J9FN-P3ZH].
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funding,71 citing President Trump’s Islamophobic rhetoric72 and the
Administration’s anti-Muslim policies.73
Initially, the Trump Administration told CVE grant recipients that
the grants were “one-time” funding opportunities.74 Proponents and
critics alike thought that—for better or for worse—the Trump
Administration would be the end of CVE programs.75 Other federal
and local initiatives continued to implement CVE; for instance, DOJ
disbursed a CVE grant, and the National Institute of Justice was
spending millions of dollars to research CVE.76 However, the
Administration’s 2018 “National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the
United States of America” repeatedly used the term “radical Islamist
terrorists,” identifying it as the “primary transnational terrorist threat”
to the United States.77 Even if the Administration was not taking up the
71. See, e.g., Deepa Bharath, LA Mayor Turns down $425k in Federal Funding to
Counter Violent Extremism After Opposition from Civil Rights Groups Stalls Process, L.A. DAILY
NEWS (Aug. 16, 2018, 5:23 PM), https://www.dailynews.com/2018/08/16/la-mayorturns-down-425k-in-federal-funding-to-counter-violent-extremism-after-oppositionfrom-civil-rights-groups-stalls-process [https://perma.cc/W72M-AGLG]; Amy B.
Wang, Muslim Nonprofit Groups Are Rejecting Federal Funds Because of Trump, WASH. POST
(Feb. 11, 2017, 12:40 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2017/02/11/it-all-came-down-to-principle-muslim-nonprofit-groups-arerejecting-federal-funds-because-of-trump [https://perma.cc/6EUA-RVGU].
72. See, e.g., Brian Klaas, A Short History of President Trump’s Anti-Muslim Bigotry,
WASH. POST: DEMOCRACYPOST (Mar. 15, 2019, 3:39 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/2019/03/15/short-history-president-trumps-anti-muslim-bigotry
[https://perma.cc/WT6N-CGWD]; 86 Times Donald Trump Displayed or Promoted
Islamophobia, MEDIUM (Apr. 19, 2018), https://medium.com/nilc/86-times-donaldtrump-displayed-or-promoted-islamophobia-49e67584ac10.
73. See Wang, supra note 71 (citing the President’s ban on travel from
predominately Muslim countries and the Administration’s proposal to change CVE
programs to “Countering Islamic Extremism” as reasons for declining funding).
74. John Bowden, Trump Will Not Renew Obama-Era Program to Fight Domestic
Terrorism: Report, HILL (Nov. 1, 2018, 8:38 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/
defense/414448-trump-will-not-renew-obama-era-program-to-fight-domesticterrorism-report [https://perma.cc/BCM7-35NS].
75. See, e.g., Mauleón, supra note 26; Eric Rosand & Stevan Weine, On CVE, the
Trump Administration Could Have Been Worse, BROOKINGS (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/04/07/on-cve-the-trumpadministration-could-have-been-worse [https://perma.cc/NW4U-K5WU] (noting
that DHS’s willingness to build on some of the “successes” of Obama-era CVE
programs is “a far cry from what many expected in January 2017”).
76. Mauleón, supra note 26.
77. See WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 7 (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018
/10/NSCT.pdf [https://perma.cc/UHY8-GP8A].
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helm of CVE as it existed under Obama, it indicated it would continue
to promote policies and implement counterterrorism programming
using the same approach—one that targets American Muslims.78
As it was winding down the Obama-era CVE grants, the Trump
Administration initially renamed the Office of Community Partnerships
as the Office of Terrorism Prevention Partnerships (OTPP), slashing its
funding and staffing.79 Then, on April 19, 2019, DHS announced that
OTPP would transition into the Office for Targeted Violence and
Terrorism Prevention (OTVTP).80 Rather than scale back the Obama
Administration’s CVE programs, OTVTP merely rebranded and even
expanded them, explaining that the Office “widens the scope of previous
[DHS] efforts” and “build[s] upon the broad range of prevention
activities that are currently implemented . . . including grants, community
awareness and law enforcement awareness briefings, threat assessments,
information sharing, and reporting of tips and leads.”81 OTVTP’s
mission is extraordinarily similar to that of its Obama-era predecessor,
stating that the heart of its prevention efforts is to “equip and empower
local efforts—including [through] peers, teachers, community

78. See id. at 21 (emphasis added) (“We will undermine the ability of terrorist
ideologies, particularly radical Islamist terrorist ideologies, to create a common identity and
sense of purpose among potential recruits.”); see also Seamus Hughes & Haroro J.
Ingram, Trump’s Domestic Countering Violent Extremism Policies Look a Lot like Obama’s,
LAWFARE (Mar. 10, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trumps-domesticcountering-violent-extremism-policies-look-lot-obamas
[https://perma.cc/DVP7G6AY] (highlighting the similarities between the Trump and Obama Administrations’
respective CVE policies, despite the apparent facial and rhetorical differences between
the policies).
79. See Peter Beinart, Trump Shut Programs to Counter Violent Extremism, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/trump-shutcountering-violent-extremism-program/574237
[https://perma.cc/DBW3-PB4J]
(noting that the Trump Administration cut OTPP’s full-time staff in half and slashed
its budget from more than $21 million to less than $3 million); Eric Rosand, When
Fighting Domestic Terrorism, You Get What You Pay for, BROOKINGS (Nov. 2, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/11/02/when-fightingdomestic-terrorism-you-get-what-you-pay-for [https://perma.cc/X3HT-F4DY]
(arguing that the “name change only further complicate[d] the goal of building trust
and partnership between the federal government and key communities”).
80. Acting Secretary McAleenan Announces Establishment of DHS Office for Targeted
Violence and Terrorism Prevention, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.
dhs.gov/news/2019/04/19/acting-secretary-mcaleenan-announces-establishmentdhs-office-targeted-violence-and [https://perma.cc/RE59-QLB8].
81. Id. (emphasis added).
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leaders, and law enforcement—to prevent individuals from mobilizing
to violence.”82
On April 21, 2020, DHS designated $10 million for the Targeted
Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) Grant Program.83 This
program will fund programs by state and local governments,
nonprofits, and institutions of higher education that further three
priorities: (1) “establishing and enhancing local prevention frameworks,”
(2) “preventing domestic terrorism,” and (3) “finding innovative
solutions for preventing targeted violence and terrorism.”84 The
program is still in the application process, and grantees will implement
their projects from October 2020 to September 2022.85 It remains to
be seen what programs will be implemented and who they will target.
Meanwhile, a group of more than seventy community organizations
and civil rights groups sent a letter to DHS, asking the government to
discontinue the TVTP grant program as a continuation of CVE
initiatives that “discriminatorily target Muslim communities and fail to
safeguard the constitutional rights and privacy of participants.”86 TVTP’s
new grant program runs the risk of targeting American Muslims in the
discriminatory way its 2016 counterpart did and should be scrutinized
closely.

82. Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://www.dhs.gov/tvtp [https://perma.cc/YWB8-GBEW]. Compare id. (noting that
the primary goal of the OTVTP’s prevention efforts involves equipping and
empowering local efforts “to prevent individuals from mobilizing to violence”), with
Identifying the Enemy, supra note 61 (explaining that CVE is a key focus of “DHS’s work
to secure the homeland,” and that “[w]ell-informed families and communities” are the
“best defense against terrorist ideologies”).
83. DHS Makes $10 Million in Funding Available for Targeted Violence and Terrorism
Prevention Grants, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.dhs.gov
/news/2020/04/21/dhs-makes-10-million-funding-available-targeted-violence-andterrorism-prevention [https://perma.cc/524S-UPKN].
84. Id.
85. OFFICE OF TARGETED VIOLENCE & TERRORISM PREVENTION (TVTP), FY 20
TARGETED VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM PREVENTION GRANT PROGRAM 5, 8 (2020),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_0414_tvtp_tvtp-grantprogram-nofo-rollout-webinar-slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT8Y-WA3X].
86. Letter from Muslim Advocates et al., to Chad F. Wolf, Acting Sec’y of
Homeland Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 1, 2020), https://muslim
advocates.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020.06.01-Letter-to-DHS-Re_-TVTPgrants-FINAL.pdf.
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2.

CVE in the Twin Cities
In 2014, DOJ, in partnership with DHS and NCTC, initiated CVE
pilot programs in Boston, Los Angeles, and the Twin Cities.87 The Twin
Cities program sought to address the root causes of radicalization,
specifically in the Somali community, through partnerships among
community leaders, law enforcement, and the government.88
Minnesota is home to the largest population of Somali immigrants
in the United States.89 There are an estimated 48,800 Somalis living in
Minnesota, nearly half of whom are under the age of twenty-two.90
Somalis started migrating to Minnesota following the Somali Civil War
in the early 1990s.91 Given the community’s nearly twenty-year history
of putting down roots in Minnesota, as of 2018, forty-one percent of
Minnesotans with Somali ancestry had been born in the United
States.92 Unfortunately, eighty percent of Minnesotan Somalis are
living below or near the poverty threshold93 due to the structural
obstacles posed to Somalis’ upward economic mobility.94
The Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab began recruiting
Minnesotan Somalis to fight overseas in the regional war in East Africa
in 2007.95 Since then, more than twenty Somalis have been charged in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota for joining, or

87. Pilot Programs Are Key to Our Countering Violent Extremism Efforts, U.S. DEP’T JUST.
ARCHIVES (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/pilot-progr amsare-key-our-countering-violent-extremism-efforts [https://perma.cc/2VVB-FSFX]
[hereinafter Pilot Programs].
88. Id.
89. See CHAMBERS, supra note 11, at 57–59, 64 (explaining that Somali refugees
gravitated toward the Twin Cities for its economic growth, employment opportunities,
affordable housing, public benefits, and history of supporting refugees).
90. MINN. STATE DEMOGRAPHIC CTR., THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF MINNESOTANS 8–9
(2018),
https://mn.gov/admin/assets/MNSDC_EconStatus_2018Report_FNL_Access.pdf_tc
m36-362054.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB73-UNVN].
91. CHAMBERS, supra note 11, at 65–66.
92. MINN. STATE DEMOGRAPHIC CTR., supra note 90, at 10.
93. Id. at 26.
94. See CHAMBERS, supra note 11, at 133–34 (pointing to limited English-language
skills and the lack of advanced degrees or non-recognition of advanced degrees
obtained in Somalia as barriers to economic mobility, despite the population’s
economic contributions in cities across the United States).
95. BUILDING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE, supra note 13, at 2; ARUN KUNDNANI, THE
MUSLIMS ARE COMING!: ISLAMOPHOBIA, EXTREMISM, AND THE DOMESTIC WAR ON TERROR
211 (2014).
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attempting to join, al-Shabaab.96 Some Minnesotan Somalis have also
“traveled, attempted to travel, or taken steps in preparation to travel to
join” the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).97 None of the
terrorism prosecutions involved planned attacks within the United
States.98 Available evidence shows that al-Shabaab’s focus on the regional
war in East Africa and local needs in Somalia drove its recruitment,
rather than a desire to perpetrate terrorist attacks in the United
States.99 FBI agents in Minneapolis admitted that “[t]here’s no real
information, no credible intelligence that [an al-Shabaab attack on the
United States] is in the works, . . . imminently in the plans, or going to
take place.”100
Nevertheless, the federal government took the stance that “to think
of al-Shabaab as only engaging in attacks in East Africa was ‘a failure of
imagination’” and moved ahead under the assumption that Minnesotan
Somalis posed a terrorist threat to the United States.101 Pulling tactics
from gang reduction programs, the Twin Cities CVE program aims to
build “resilience” to recruitment by extremist groups in the Somali
community by establishing relationships with law enforcement and creating
frameworks for “interventions” of individuals at risk of “radicalization.”102
As laid out in the White House’s Strategic Implementation Plan, the
U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota was involved in the
implementation of the pilot program in the Twin Cities.103 As part of
the program, the District, led by then-U.S. Attorney Andrew Luger,
established the Somali American Task Force, made up of fifteen
American Somalis, including imams and local non-profit organizers.104
The Task Force signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S.

96. BUILDING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE, supra note 13, at 2.
97. Id.
98. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 112 (noting that the Minnesotan Somali
community itself was the victim of terrorism in a bombing of a local mosque in 2017).
99. KUNDNANI, supra note 95, at 211.
100. Id.
101. See id. (quoting Congressman Peter King at a 2011 committee hearing on
Muslim radicalization).
102. BUILDING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE, supra note 13, at 4–5.
103. See supra notes 35, 38 and accompanying text (noting that the White House’s
updated plan charged U.S. Attorneys with leading federal CVE initiatives in their
respective districts).
104. Amanda Sperber, Somalis in Minnesota Question Counter-Extremism Program
Targeted at Muslims, GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://www.theguard
ian.com/us-news/2015/sep/14/somali-muslims-minnesota-counter-extremismprogram [https://perma.cc/LW4Y-XCQG].
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Attorney’s Office that the government would not use the program for
surveillance or intelligence-gathering.105 However, many in the
community, including some Task Force members, were concerned about
and suspicious of the U.S. Attorney’s involvement in the provision of
social services.106
The White House and several U.S. agencies chose the Twin Cities for
the pilot program because of “strong relationships” between local law
enforcement and the Somali community.107 This “strong relationship”
may actually refer to local law enforcement’s targeting of the Somali
community under the umbrella of “counter-radicalization” with
backing from the federal government for nearly a decade prior to the
creation of the pilot program.108 For example, through a two-year
grant, DOJ funded the St. Paul Police Department’s African Immigrant
Muslim Coordinated Outreach Program (AIMCOP).109 In its successful
grant proposal to DOJ, AIMCOP claimed it would, in partnership with
the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s Office, “first seek to gain the trust of
the Somali immigrants” by holding and attending community meetings
and youth activities.110 AIMCOP would then “identify radicalized
individuals . . . who refuse[d] to cooperate with [its] efforts” and
enhance its ability to “maintain up-to-date intelligence on these
offenders.”111 As part of the DOJ program, the Muslim American Society
of Minnesota received funding to hire a police liaison.112 The police
asked the organization’s executive director to “keep track of attendees
105. Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Att’y’s Office for the Dist. of
Minn. and the Somali Am. Task Force, 1, 4 (May 11, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/
usao-mn/file/764306/download [https://perma.cc/W6V3-HDX8].
106. See Sperber, supra note 104 (quoting a Somali parent as saying that she wants
more resources available to support the community’s youth, but without the tag of
“terrorism” or “violence” attached).
107. BUILDING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE, supra note 13, at 3.
108. See generally MICHAEL PRICE, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, COMMUNITY OUTREACH
OR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING?: A CLOSER LOOK AT “COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM”
PROGRAMS, 1, 5 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/
Community_Outreach_or_Intelligence_Gathering.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9G33LSQ] (detailing the involvement of Twin Cities’ law enforcement in targeting the
Somali community since 2004).
109. Id. at 5.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 5–6 (“[T]he AIMCOP team does not appear to have informed the
Muslim/Somali community that failure to participate . . . could result in being put on
a list of radicalized youth.”). The St. Paul Police Department maintains that the
“intelligence aspect never came to fruition.” Id. at 6.
112. Amna Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. 834, 900 (2015).
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at outreach meetings,” and later asked him to share the list of
participants, which the director refused to do.113
Around the time of the creation of AIMCOP, the FBI launched a
similar strategy through “Specialized Community Outreach Team[s]”
(SCOT), which would “strategically expand outreach to the Somali
community” in Minneapolis to address counterterrorism issues.114 The
Teams gathered intelligence in the community and sent information
to the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit to “develop a baseline profile of
Somali individuals that [were] vulnerable to being radicalized or
participating in extremist activities.”115 Despite the FBI’s own guidelines
stating that officers must maintain an “appropriate separation of
operational and outreach efforts,” an internal memo stated that the
Teams would allow “FBI outreach to support operational programs.”116
Furthermore, even though the government intended the Somali
community to lead CVE in Minneapolis, the FBI acknowledged
privately that “there was no possibility of the community [having]
influenced how the investigations were carried out” and that the FBI’s
aim should be to “encourage community leaders to pass information
to federal agents about young people.”117
DHS’s CVE grant program118 reached Minnesota when it granted
funds to the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office and the Heartland
Democracy Center.119 The Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office implemented
113. Id.
114. FBI, IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIALIZED COMMUNITY OUTREACH TEAM, 1–3, 5 (Jan.
7, 2009), http://www.stopcve.com/uploads/1/1/2/4/112447985/scot_fbi_minneap
olis.pdf [https://perma.cc/H85B-HF7W] [hereinafter SCOT Communication]; see
also Cora Currier, How Community Outreach Programs to Muslims Blur Lines Between
Outreach and Intelligence, INTERCEPT (Jan. 21, 2015, 11:10 AM), https://theintercept
.com/2015/01/21/spies-among-us-community-outreach-programs-muslims-blurlines-outreach-intelligence [https://perma.cc/6D33-G5AZ] (noting that the Teams
appeared to “run afoul” of the FBI’s community engagement guidelines, which require
that officers maintain “appropriate separation of operational and outreach efforts”).
115. SCOT Communication, supra note 114, at 2, 4–5.
116. Currier, supra note 114.
117. Akbar, supra note 112, at 893.
118. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text (explaining the CVE grant
program as a way for states, local governments, and non-profits to fund projects
focused on resilience, community engagement, and intervention management).
119. See Stephen Montemayor, Homeland Security Announces Two Counterextremism
Grants for Minnesota, STAR TRIB. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.startribune.com/
homeland-security-announces-two-extremism-grants-for-minnesota/430455753
[https://perma.cc/BN6J-2UU4] (noting that the CVE program granted $347,600 to
the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office and $423,340 to Heartland Democracy, a
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community engagement workshops and expanded its Community
Engagement Team, with a focus on Islamist terrorist movements and
Somali youth.120 Heartland Democracy Center used the funds to expand
its existing program working with Somali youth and focus on
countering violent extremism by implementing intervention activities
and developing “individual or community-level resilience to recruitment
and radicalization.”121 Additionally, since 2010, DHS’s Office for Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties has held roundtables with federal, state, and
local government officials about thirty times a year in regions with large
Muslim, Arab, and South Asian populations, including Minneapolis, to
discuss terrorist recruitment issues in those communities.122 The discussions
regularly include officials from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, and the Transportation Security Administration.123

Minneapolis nonprofit). For the applications themselves, see HEARTLAND DEMOCRACY
CTR., STRENGTHENING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE IN THE HEARTLAND: COLLABORATION,
EDUCATION, AND EMPOWERMENT TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM (2016),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/EMW-2016-CA-APP00401%20Full%20Application.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZL3-R2CS] (proposal for
$423,340); HENNEPIN CTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE, FOCUS AREA 2—COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT:
A FRONTLINE STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (2016), https://www.dhs.
gov/sites/default/files/publications/EMW-2016-CA-APP00081%20Full%20Application.pdf [https://perma.cc/VDW2-8RRN] (proposal for
$500,000). Notably, Ka Joog, a Somali, Minneapolis-based nonprofit, rejected the
nearly $500,000 it had been granted under the Obama Administration after President
Trump took office, stating it felt that its efforts were hindered by the Administration’s
anti-Muslim sentiments. Montemayor, supra.
120. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM TO PREPARE
COMMUNITIES FOR COMPLEX COORDINATED TERRORIST ATTACKS AND THE COUNTERING
VIOLENT EXTREMISM GRANT PROGRAM 23 (2018) [hereinafter EFFECTIVENESS OF GRANT
PROGRAM] (reporting to Congress on the progress of the CVE grant programs with a
distinct focus on activities targeting Muslims). But see HENNEPIN CTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
supra note 119, at 2 (“The problem of violent extremism is not limited to . . . any one
religion, . . . or ethnic group; accordingly, our Agency plans all . . . engagement for all
residents.”).
121. EFFECTIVENESS OF GRANTS PROGRAM, supra note 120, at 21. Heartland
Democracy Center notably led the effort to “deradicalize” and rehabilitate Abdullahi
Yusuf, a Somali American teenager who was charged with conspiring to join a terrorist
organization when he tried to leave Minneapolis to join the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS). Miriam Jordan & Tamara Audi, A Test Case for ‘Deradicalization’, WALL ST.
J. (May 6, 2015, 4:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-test-case-for-deradicali
zation-1430944585?alg=y [https://perma.cc/2MUB-7593].
122. Akbar, supra note 112, at 864–65.
123. Id. at 865 n.132.
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In addition to government agencies and law enforcement,
Minneapolis public schools have joined CVE efforts targeting Somali
students.124 An overall growth in surveillance of Minnesotan students
makes Minneapolis schools’ involvement in CVE efforts even more
concerning.125 The school program requests that “teachers and other
school staff . . . monitor and identify students who they believe are at
risk of ‘radicalization’ or engaging in ‘violent extremism’” and calls for
students to be monitored “in the lunchroom, non-class environments,
and after school.”126 Minneapolis public schools planned to hire additional
staff to monitor Somali students specifically for CVE purposes.127 The
Be@School program, implemented in partnership between the
Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, Hennepin County school
districts, and Ka Joog (a Minneapolis-based Somali nonprofit), tracks
unexcused absences of students,128 leading to additional concerns that
Somali students are being inappropriately targeted.129

124. See Minneapolis Public School CVE Program, C-SPAN (Feb. 18, 2015),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4530677/minneapolis-public-school-cve-program
[https://perma.cc/7CHB-HV84] (video of a Minneapolis Public Schools official
announcing plans for involvement in addressing radicalization in the Somali
community at the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism).
125. Ramla Bile & Dominique Diaddigo-Cash, The Surveillance-Industrial Complex Is
Targeting Our Kids, MINNPOST (January 31, 2020), https://www.minnpost.com/
community-voices/2020/01/the-surveillance-industrial-complex-is-targeting-our-kids
[https://perma.cc/7YGD-439S] (highlighting problematic surveillance initiatives in
Minnesotan school districts).
126. Anna V. Pinchuk, Note, Countering Free Speech: CVE Pilot Programs’ Chilling Effect
on Protected Free Speech and Expression, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 661, 671–72 (2018); see also
Emmanuel Mauleón, Comment, Black Twice: Policing Black Muslim Identities, 65 UCLA
L. REV. 1326, 1364–66 (detailing that monitoring would take place in “[a]fter-school
programs, recreation center classes, [and] sports leagues”).
127. Mauleón, supra note 126, at 1365 n.180.
128. Be@School, KA JOOG, https://www.kajoog.org/beschool [https://perma.cc/4NZDZQQ4] (defining the program’s mission as increasing school attendance and improving
community connections through a “collaborative early intervention providing education
and support services” to youth and their families).
129. See Mauleón, supra note 126, at 1366 (raising concerns that students may
become uncomfortable and change their behavior if they think they are being
monitored and subsequently raise false flags of potential radicalization); Bile &
Diaddigo-Cash, supra note 125 (“Tracking of behavior classification, intervention, and
academic performance are now becoming the basis for surveillance of youth with
unaddressed needs. Measures like these further distance us from addressing the root
causes that fuel crime and incarceration.”); Sperber, supra note 104 (explaining that
the Somali community is suspicious of the intermingling between law enforcement,
surveillance, and social services).
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3.

Criticisms of CVE
Proponents of CVE argue that the programs are critical because they
seek to prevent extremist violence rather than merely react to it.130 The
programs also may provide crucial social services to communities,
especially to youths.131 On the other hand, critics of CVE maintain that
the methodology behind the radicalization theory and the CVE
programs are ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst.132 Its
ineffectiveness is exacerbated by the disproportionate way it affects
American Muslims in a time where right-wing extremists perpetrate
the vast majority of extremist violence in the United States.133 CVE also
contributes to the stigmatization of American Muslims, including the
Somali community in the Twin Cities, as evidenced by discrimination,
harassment, and hate crimes.134
CVE critics highlight the instability of the foundations upon which
CVE programs are built; the programs presume that extremist ideology
is a precursor to terrorism and that there is a “predictable path toward
terrorism with clear markers that can be used to identify potential
terrorists.”135 Since the concept and study of “radicalization” were born
to cater to policymakers rather than objective scholars, radicalization
has “a number of built-in, limiting assumptions.”136 Experts in
counterterrorism, psychology, and economics have all found that there

130. See, e.g., BJELOPERA, supra note 32, at 2; Selim, supra note 7, at 95. This
Comment is most focused on preventative CVE programs, which should not be
conflated with deradicalization and rehabilitation programs that seek to help individuals
who have already taken concrete steps toward criminal activity. For an example of
rehabilitation activities, see supra note 121.
131. See infra note 274 and accompanying text. But see Vanessa Taylor, ‘Why
Minneapolis?’: How Deep Surveillance of Black Muslims Paved the Way for George Floyd’s
Murder, PROGRESSIVE (June 8, 2020), https://progressive.org/dispatches/deepsurveillance-black-muslims-taylor-200608 [https://perma.cc/3MCR-T83K] (quoting
one Minneapolis community organizer and chaplain as saying that CVE was “marketed
as a health and human services program . . . but in reality it was an extension of the
state-security apparatus”).
132. See, e.g., PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 43, at 9; Cynthia Gonzalez, We’ve Been Here
Before: Countering Violent Extremism Through Community Policing, 74 NAT’L LAW. GUILD
REV. 1, 7–8 (2017); Mauleón, supra note 126, at 1352. See generally Aziz, supra note 6, at
257 (highlighting fundamental flaws of CVE programs).
133. See infra notes 146–51 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 152–57 and accompanying text.
135. PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 43, at 9.
136. KUNDNANI, supra note 95, at 117.
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is currently no answer to what drives a person to extremist violence and
that research running contrary to popular CVE policy is often ignored.137
Not only has research by CVE opponents debunked the assumption
that there is a clear path toward violence, but government-issued CVE
guides admit it themselves.138 Notably, the FBI’s declassified Strategic
Plan to Curb Violent Extremism stated:
There is neither one path or personality type, which is prone to
adopting extremist views or exhibiting violent tendencies, nor is
there a singular path or personality that leaves an individual
vulnerable to others who may seek to impress these views or
tendencies upon them. There are no individually unique behavioral
changes for those who mobilize to violent extremism.139

Furthermore, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
conducted an assessment on federal government CVE efforts in a 2017
report to Congress.140 The report concluded that GAO could not
“determine the extent to which the United States is better off today as
a result of its CVE effort” since the advent of the program in 2011
because, in part, the federal government has failed to establish a
process to evaluate the overall effort’s effectiveness.141 The FBI field
office in Minneapolis has admitted that they have no credible evidence
that an al-Shabaab attack in the United States by Minnesotan Somalis
may occur.142 Nevertheless, federal and local governments have invested
resources in Minnesota following misguided methodologies “in the
hope of finding the magical indicators of a drift to extremism.”143
137. See PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 43, at 9 (quoting multiple counterterrorism
experts opining that the causal link between “radicalization” and terrorism is
unfounded); Matt Apuzzo, Who Will Become a Terrorist? Research Yields Few Clues, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/28/world/europe/
mystery-about-who-will-become-a-terrorist-defies-clear-answers.html
[https://perma.cc/5HW5-4FQK] (citing a Princeton economist’s study that found no
correlation between “economic distress” and terrorism, even though CVE proponents
continue to rely on poverty as an “indicator of radicalization”).
138. See, e.g., DHS STRATEGY, supra note 60, at 10 (“Violent extremism is difficult to
predict, detect, and disrupt because there is no single cause or pathway to violence.”).
139. FBI, FBI STRATEGIC PLAN TO CURB VIOLENT EXTREMISM 2 (2015), https://www.
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/16-cv-00672%20%20FBI%20Strategic%20Plan%20to%20Curb%20Violent%20Extremism.PDF
[https://perma.cc/XJV7-GX4S].
140. GAO REPORT, supra note 26.
141. Id. at 16.
142. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (contending that CVE efforts in the
Twin Cities are not directed toward a credible threat to the United States).
143. KUNDNANI, supra note 95, at 229.
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In addition to being ineffective, radicalization theory and CVE
programs run the risk of exacerbating the feelings of marginalization
of American Muslims that CVE programs identify as indicators of
radicalization in the first place. In the Twin Cities, one of the Somalis
who al-Shabaab successfully recruited said that initially, joining the
group never crossed his mind and he thought it was “a stupid thing.”144
However, after the FBI and local police escalated their surveillance and
interrogation of Minnesotan Somalis in 2008, the recruit’s mindset
changed and he said he understood why people would leave Minnesota
and join al-Shabaab.145
In a time when perpetrators of domestic violent extremism are
largely right-wing extremists, CVE programs disproportionately target
American Muslims. Right-wing extremist violence surpasses Islamist
extremism in the United States.146 From 2009 to 2018, right-wing
extremists were responsible for 72.3 percent of extremist-related murders
on U.S. soil.147 Notably, while Islamist extremists perpetrated 23.4
percent of extremist-related killings in the United States during this
time, they have committed “far fewer lethal incidents”; the ones that
did occur were high casualty.148 Specifically, “[o]nly [twelve] lethal
domestic Islamist extremist incidents have occurred in the past [ten]
years, but those incidents have resulted in 100 deaths.”149 Despite the
comparatively fewer deaths that Islamic extremists have caused since
2009, eighty percent of the non-profit groups that have been awarded
funding to provide community services under the umbrella of CVE
have been focused on Muslims.150 A 2016 survey of nearly 400 law
enforcement agencies across the country found that although the
agencies had “serious concerns” about right-wing or anti-government
extremism, none of them “had a formal outreach program designed
144. Id. at 226.
145. Id.
146. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE CTR. ON EXTREMISM, MURDER AND EXTREMISM IN THE
UNITED STATES IN 2018 13–17 (2019), https://www.adl.org/media/12480/download
[https://perma.cc/ECZ4-E6RF].
147. Id. at 16. In 2018, only two percent of all domestic extremist-related murders
were committed by perpetrators affiliated with Islamist extremism. Id. at 13.
148. Id. at 16.
149. Id. at 17.
150. PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 43, at 8. Notably, Muslims make up about 1.1
percent of the entire U.S. population. Besheer Mohamed, New Estimates Show U.S.
Muslim Population Continues to Grow, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Jan. 3, 2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/03/new-estimates-show-u-smuslim-population-continues-to-grow [https://perma.cc/SCE4-2SP8].
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to counteract anti-government, racist, or other forms of violence.”151
This disconnect raises serious questions about the efficacy of CVE
programs in actually preventing violent extremism in the United States
and about the impact the programs have on the civil liberties of
American Muslims.
In addition to the programs’ lack of effectiveness, their legitimizing
of discrimination against Muslims is a criticism that nonprofits,
advocacy groups, and the communities with which CVE programs aim
to engage have lodged against the programs.152 American Muslims are
more likely than Americans of other major religious groups to experience
racial or religious discrimination.153 During 2015, hate crimes against
American Muslims spiked by seventy-eight percent, with hundreds of
documented attacks including “arsons at mosques, assaults, shootings
and threats of violence.”154
In the Twin Cities, Somalis have been the victims of hate crimes and
numerous domestic terrorist attacks themselves. In 2016, a man “shouting
obscenities about Islam” shot two Muslim men wearing traditional Muslim
attire in Minneapolis.155 Three members of the racist, anti-government
White Rabbit militia bombed the Dar Al-Farooq Islamic Center, a
151. PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 43, at 19; see also SCHANZER ET AL., THE CHALLENGE
PROMISE OF USING COMMUNITY POLICING STRATEGIES TO PREVENT VIOLENT
EXTREMISM: A CALL FOR COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT TO ENHANCE
PUBLIC SAFETY 1, 21–23 (2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
249674.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FYA-VEH4] (finding that, although many law
enforcement agencies have programs engaging with Muslim communities, “they do
not have organized, overt efforts to reach out to non-Muslim communities that may be
targeted for recruitment by anti-government, racist, or other extremist movements”).
152. See, e.g., Aziz, supra note 6, at 265; Mauleón, supra note 126, at 1365 n.179
(“[T]he government leverages these fears . . . into a strategy that serves to stigmatize
the community, and presents CVE as the only option for allaying these fears.”).
153. Islamophobia: Understanding Anti-Muslim Sentiment in the West, GALLUP,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/157082/islamophobia-understanding-anti-muslimsentiment-west.aspx [https://perma.cc/P277-NMNX] (reporting that the proportion
of American Muslims reporting discrimination is on par with Hispanic Americans and
African Americans).
154. Eric Lichtblau, Hate Crimes Against American Muslims Most Since Post-9/11 Era,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/us/politics/hatecrimes-american-muslims-rise.html [https://perma.cc/RF77-ZWXT]. More recently,
the FBI’s 2018 hate crime statistics indicated that hate crimes against Muslims
accounted for 14.5 percent of 1,550 total reported hate crimes motivated by religious
bias, or approximately 225 incidents. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: HATE CRIME
STATISTICS, 2018 3 (2019), https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2018/topic-pages/incid
ents-and-offenses.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY7P-LSDZ].
155. Lichtblau, supra note 154.
AND
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mosque just outside of Minneapolis that mainly serves Somalis, in
2017.156 In September 2019, a man vandalized several Somali businesses
in Minneapolis, telling police after his arrest that he hates “the
Somalis.”157
One former FBI crime analyst believes the spike in hate crimes
against Muslims is caused in part by American politicians’ “raising the
specter that radical Islam is at our doorstep.”158 In the case of
Minnesota, Congresswoman Ilhan Omar, a Democratic congresswoman
who came to the United States as a refugee from Somalia in her
childhood, has been the target of Islamophobic and racist rhetoric by
American political leaders, including President Trump.159 In July 2019,
President Trump tweeted about Congresswoman Omar and four other
congresswomen of color,160 stating they should “go back and help fix
the totally broken and crime infested places from which they came.”161
At a rally, when President Trump spoke about Congresswoman Omar,
the crowd chanted “send her back.”162 Anti-Muslim rhetoric and
stereotypes are a regular part of recent political discourse, and critics
argue that CVE “facilitates Islamophobia on the ground and, for many
political candidates, creates political incentives for fear-mongering.”163

156. Andrew Hay, Three Men Indicted for Minnesota Mosque Bombing, REUTERS (June
21, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-minnesota-blast-indictment/threemen-indicted-for-minnesota-mosque-bombing-idUSKBN1JH3DJ;
Stephen
Montemayor, How Alleged Minnesota Mosque Bomber Tried to Build Militia in Rural Ill.,
STAR TRIB. (Mar. 18, 2018), http://www.startribune.com/fbi-says-alleged-minnesotamosque-bomber-tried-to-build-a-militia-in-rural-illinois/477182203
[https://perma.cc/TQW7-2NH8].
157. Mukhtar M. Ibrahim, Charges: Prejudice Drove Mpls. Man to Vandalize East AfricanOwned Shops, MPR NEWS (Sept. 27. 2019), https://www.mprnews.org/story/
2019/09/27/charges-bias-drove-minneapolis-man-vandalize-east-african-owned-shops
[https://perma.cc/4E6B-VQZ2].
158. Lichtblau, supra note 154.
159. Merrit Kennedy, Rep. Ilhan Omar Receives Resounding Welcome Home amid Trump
Attacks, NPR (July 19, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/19/743326091/repilhan-omar-receives-heros-welcome-home-amid-trump-attacks
[https://perma.cc/BD2X-SM7G].
160. Id.
161. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER (July 14, 2019, 8:27 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1150381395078000643.
162. Kennedy, supra note 159.
163. See Khaled A. Beydoun, “Muslim Bans” and the (Re)Making of Political
Islamophobia, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1733, 1755 (2017) (detailing the roots of
Islamophobia in American law and politics dating back to the Naturalization Act of
1790).
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The targeting and surveillance of Minnesotan Somalis by law
enforcement does not exist within a vacuum. For centuries, law
enforcement agencies in the Twin Cities have been accused of racially
profiling subjects and using excessive force against people of color.164
On May 25, 2020, a white Minneapolis Police Department officer,
Derek Chauvin, killed George Floyd, a Black man, by kneeling on his
neck for eight minutes and forty-six seconds.165 Floyd had been accused
of using a counterfeit twenty-dollar bill to buy cigarettes.166 The brutal
killing of George Floyd sparked protests around the globe,167 which
police forces, including in Minnesota, confronted by “using tear gas
and firing rubber bullets into the crowds.”168 On June 7, 2020, the

164. See J. J. Wiley, WESTERN APPEAL (St. Paul & Minneapolis), Oct. 15, 1887, at 4
(describing the arrest of a Black woman in St. Paul by police after she was harassed by
white men); Tommy Beer, Minneapolis Police Are 7 Times More Likely to Use Force Against
Black People, FORBES (June 3, 2020 2:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
tommybeer/2020/06/03/minneapolis-police-are-7-times-more-likely-to-use-forceagainst-black-people/#224e55af1321 [https://perma.cc/PNR6-EUYP] (“Although
[B]lack people make up less than 20% of the population in Minneapolis, nearly 60%
of the time that police use force, the individual subjected to that force is [B]lack.”);
Ianna Oatis et al., Race and Policing in the Twin Cities, MNOPEDIA (June 2, 2020),
https://www.mnopedia.org/race-and-policing-twin-cities [https://perma.cc/MX4H37JL] (listing incidents of racially-discriminatory law enforcement since the
nineteenth century); Melissa Olson, Indigenous Minnesotans—Key Voice on Racial
Profiling—Split on Future of Minneapolis Police Department, MINN. REFORMER (June 30,
2020), https://minnesotareformer.com/2020/06/30/indigenous-minnesotans-keyvoice-on-police-brutality-and-racial-profiling-split-on-future-of-minneapolis-policedepartment [https://perma.cc/5Y6G-D33D] (explaining the disproportionately high
rates at which indigenous Americans are stopped, searched, arrested, and killed by
police, including in Minnesota); Philando Castile Death: Police Footage Released, BBC (June 21,
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40357355 [https://perma.cc/FGT7CLMY] (recounting the fatal shooting by police of Black Minnesotan Philando Castile
during a traffic stop).
165. What We Know About the Death of George Floyd in Minneapolis, N.Y. TIMES (May 27,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/27/us/george-floyd-minneapolis-death.html
[https://perma.cc/S84V-RQ3Q] (noting that three additional officers stood by and
watched, even as Floyd became unresponsive for two minutes and fifty-three seconds).
166. Id.
167. See Protests Across the Globe After George Floyd’s Death, CNN (June 13, 2020, 3:22 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/world/gallery/intl-george-floydprotests/index.html [https://perma.cc/BXE9-27AC] (displaying photos from protests
across the world, including in Brazil, Hong Kong, England, Tunisia, and South Africa).
168. Matt Furber et al., Minneapolis Police, Long Accused of Racism, Face Wrath of
Wounded City, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/27/
us/minneapolis-police.html [https://perma.cc/7GRZ-V7KD]. Over 100 law
enforcement agencies in cities across the United States used tear gas against civilians
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Minneapolis city council pledged to disband the Minneapolis Police
Department and to “recreate systems of public safety that actually keep
[citizens] safe.”169
Some, but not all, American Somalis identify as Black.170 In the
United States, Somalis “experience interlocking systems of oppression
because of their intersecting minority statuses” as Black people,
refugees or immigrants, and Muslims.171 Somali youth “increasingly
incorporat[e] [B]lack identity rather than seeing themselves almost
exclusively as Somalis, which some of their parents did.”172
As with most people, American Somalis do not view their own
identities and cultures as monolithic. However, external preconceptions,
particularly by white people, can affect how American Somalis are treated

in the protests following George Floyd’s death. See K.K. Rebecca Lai et al., Here Are the
100 U.S. Cities Where Protesters Were Tear-Gassed, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/16/us/george-floyd-protests-policetear-gas.html?auth=login-google [https://perma.cc/7VGN-NPQB] (compiling a list of
incidents where tear gas was used against protesters).
169. Sam Levin, Minneapolis Lawmakers Vow to Disband Police Department in Historic
Move, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2020, 10:24 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2020/jun/07/minneapolis-city-council-defund-police-george-floyd
[https://perma.cc/CS2E-2PYZ] (quoting Lisa Bender, the Minneapolis city council
president).
170. Habesha Gaaffaa-Geeska Yäafrika, Are Eritreans, Ethiopians, Habeshas, Somalis,
Horn of Africa People, and Other East Africans “Black?,” MEDIUM (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://medium.com/@habeshaunion/are-eritreans-ethiopians-habeshas-somalishorn-of-africa-people-and-other-east-africans-9400dfbd616e [https://perma.cc/X2L2WYAZ] (explaining that while East Africans, including Somalis, are Black, “[n]o one
in these cultures and countries use the term ‘Black’ to identify themselves” because
being Black is a “Western and Eurocentric concept”). Compare Nnenna Lindsay, Racial
Identity Development of Somali Refugees in the Midwest 45 (Jan. 2018) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Dakota), https://commons.und.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3272&context=theses [https://perma.cc/Y6XW-7Y2E]
(interviewing a 31-year-old Minnesotan Somali woman who said, “I identify myself as a
Somali American, and I identify myself as a Black Muslim woman. That is my identity
and that is my strength”), with Lindsay, supra, at 41 (reporting that “elders in the
Somali community do not identify as African-Americans or Black; they identify as
Somali”).
171. Lindsay, supra note 170, at 17.
172. Ibrahim Hirsi, Young Minnesota Somalis, Asserting Their Blackness, Take Center
Stage in Floyd Protests, MPR NEWS (June 3, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.mprnews
.org/story/2020/06/03/young-minnesota-somalis-asserting-their-blackness-takecenter-stage-in-floyd-protests [https://perma.cc/PA6Y-9APL].
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by employers, fellow citizens, the government, and law enforcement.173
“When it comes to the cops,” a young Minnesotan Somali recently said,
“we’re all the same thing.”174 The intersection of CVE and institutional
racism must be taken into account when assessing the programs’
harms. One young Minnesotan Somali man said that “[e]very Muslim
in America lives in fear,” and this fear leads to the feeling that they
“don’t have that so-called freedom of speech.”175 Muslims feel that law
enforcement is primarily focused on ferreting out terrorism, rather
than protecting them from hate crimes and discrimination, and these
communities feel law enforcement agencies have broken their trust by
violating their civil liberties in the past.176 The critiques of CVE
programs in the Twin Cities highlight how the harms inflicted on
American Muslims outweigh the programs’ benefits and present
obstacles to the equality of the Somali community.
B.

Equal Protection Jurisprudence

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
declares that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”177 The Supreme Court
has said that “[a]t the heart of . . . equal protection lies the simple
command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not
as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.”178
The Court has created a framework for assessing the validity of an Equal
Protection claim, asking whether there was a government classification179

173. See Lindsay, supra note 170, at 60–61 (quoting a Minnesotan Somali woman
saying, “how we identify is very, very important, but being in the [United] States I learned
that before I’m Somali I’m [B]lack . . . they don’t care what type of Black I am”).
174. Hirsi, supra note 172 (quoting another youth as saying, “[i]f you look [B]lack,
[if] your skin is dark, you’re going to be profiled”).
175. KUNDNANI, supra note 95, at 230–31.
176. See SCHANZER ET AL., supra note 151; Aziz, supra note 6, at 268 (citing testimonies
given by Muslims about concerns regarding entrapment and discrimination in law
enforcement).
177. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
178. Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ariz.
Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463
U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983) (per curiam)), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (“[A]ll persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” (citation omitted)).
179. See infra Sections I.B.1–2.
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and, if so, whether the government’s classification has a sufficient
justification to survive the level of scrutiny that courts apply.180
1.

State action
First, a valid Equal Protection claim requires a state action. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to states
and not the federal government.181 However, the Supreme Court
determined that the Equal Protection standards of the Fourteenth
Amendment would apply to the federal government through the due
process protections that the Fifth Amendment mandates the federal
government provide.182
2.

Government classification
A government classification may be impermissible on its face when
the classification explicitly singles out a group for different treatment.183
Alternatively, a classification that is facially neutral may still violate Equal
Protection standards as applied if it is an “obvious pretext for racial
discrimination”184 and “motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”185
The disproportionate impact of a facially neutral government action
is “an important starting point” to show a discriminatory purpose, but it
is not sufficient.186 “Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose” is

180. See infra Section I.B.3.
181. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
182. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500 (“[I]t would be unthinkable
that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government
[than on state governments].”); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 227
(holding that “all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor,” are subject to strict scrutiny).
183. Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 294 (3d Cir. 2015); RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 3 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 18.4 (2019).
184. Pers. Admin’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979). As detailed below,
for the purposes of Equal Protection standards, courts tend to treat discrimination on
the basis of alienage or national origin the same as racial discrimination. See infra notes
192–93 and accompanying text.
185. Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 544 (1982).
186. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977);
see also Pers. Admin’r of Mass., 442 U.S. at 283 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“To discern the
purposes underlying facially neutral policies, this Court has therefore considered . . .
any disproportionate impact.”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)
(holding that the disproportionate impact of a written personnel test on Black
applicants to a police department did not, on its own, violate Equal Protection
principles); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (“Though the law itself
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required to show an Equal Protection violation.187 This intent or purpose,
in turn, requires that the government actor meant to single out someone
based on a protected characteristic.188
3.

Levels of scrutiny
Based on the character of the government classification, the court
must determine the appropriate standard of review to apply.189 Courts
generally presume a classification is constitutional if it is “rationally
related to furthering a legitimate state interest.”190 This is referred to
as rational basis review and is the most lenient standard of review,
giving substantial deference to government actions.191 However, this
general presumption of constitutionality under rational basis gives way
to a stricter standard of review if the classification is based on either a
suspect class or the infringement of a fundamental right.192 These
classifications trigger a form of heightened scrutiny; the most rigid
form of heightened scrutiny, strict scrutiny, states that a classification
is constitutional only if it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling
state interest.193
The first type of classification that triggers heightened scrutiny is
that based on a suspect class. The Supreme Court has specifically stated
be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
and illegal discriminations . . . , the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition
of the Constitution.”).
187. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
188. See Hassan, 804 F.3d at 297–98 (citing Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 485
(2008)).
189. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 906 n.6 (1986) (“The
logical first question to ask when presented with an equal protection claim . . . is what
level of review is appropriate.”).
190. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 315 (1976) (per curiam);
see also Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (holding that a classification is
presumed constitutional unless its “varying treatment of different groups . . . is so
unrelated to the achievement of any . . . legitimate purposes that [the court] can only
conclude that the legislature’s actions were irrational”).
191. See City of Dall. v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989) (defining rational basis
review as the “most relaxed and tolerant form” of scrutiny); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton,
462 U.S. 176, 195–96 (1983) (describing rationality review as a “lenient standard”);
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314 (characterizing rational basis review as a “relatively relaxed
standard”).
192. See infra notes 194–98 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
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that government classifications based on “race, alienage, or national
origin” are suspect;194 such classifications are subject to strict scrutiny.195
More broadly however, whether a classification is suspect can be
gleaned from several other factors, including “the history of societal
discrimination, the history of political powerlessness, the presence of a
discrete and insular minority, and, most importantly, the fact of
immutability.”196
The second type of classification to warrant strict scrutiny is a
classification that infringes upon a fundamental right. A right is
fundamental when it is “explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution.”197 A classification amounts to an infringement when it
deters the exercise of a right or makes the exercise substantially more
difficult.198 Thus, a government classification is subject to strict scrutiny
if it infringes upon the rights protected by the First Amendment.
Infringement may take the form of “chilling” the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms.199 A chilling effect “occurs when individuals
seeking to engage in activity protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment are
deterred from doing so by governmental regulation not specifically
194. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. The Supreme Court has also recognized
gender and illegitimacy as suspect classes, but, for the purposes of this Comment, the
focus will be on the standard of review applicable to race, ethnicity, and national
origin.
195. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948) (holding that a trial court’s
decision to escheat an American citizen’s land to the state because it had been paid
for by the citizen’s father, who was ineligible for naturalization, violated the citizen’s
equal protection rights on the basis of his national origin); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (stating that classification of individuals of Japanese ancestry
were “immediately suspect” and subject to “the most rigid scrutiny”), abrogated by
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
196. See Margaret Chon & Donna E. Arzt, Walking While Muslim, 68 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 215, 247 (2005) (citing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES § 9.3.2 (2d ed. 2002)); see also Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724
(9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring) (analyzing similar factors to determine
whether LGBTQ status was a suspect class). An explanation of “discrete and insular
minorities,” specifically in the context of religious groups, is explored below. See infra
notes 231–35 and accompanying text.
197. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33–34 (1973).
198. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643–44 (1969) (“[T]o justify the
deterrent effect . . . on the free exercise . . . of their constitutionally protected right . . .
‘a . . . subordinating interest of the State must be compelling.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958))), overruled in part by Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
199. Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling
Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978).
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directed at that protected activity.”200 In the religious context, First
Amendment Free Exercise rights may be chilled when individuals
“downplay their religious identity” and “fear becoming too active in
the religious activities of a [religious] community.”201
Counterterrorism activities have been found to chill Muslims’
exercise of religious freedom. For example, a 2013 report202 by several
civil rights organizations interviewed American Muslims affected by the
New York Police Department (NYPD) surveillance program at issue in
Hassan v. City of New York.203 From 2001 to 2011, NYPD mapped American
Muslim communities in New York City, New Jersey, Connecticut, and
Pennsylvania by sending undercover officers into “hot-spots” (such as
restaurants, halal meat shops, and hookah bars) in Muslim
neighborhoods, as well as mosques.204 The officers would document
everything they heard and the details of people they spoke with in daily
reports.205 They also engaged in a tactic called “create and capture,”
where they would instruct informants to engage with Muslims in the
community in conversations about terrorism, record their responses,
and report back to NYPD.206 The report on the program found that
surveillance of American Muslims’ “quotidian activities” created an
atmosphere of fear and suspicion and chilled American Muslims’
exercise of their constitutional rights.207 Victims of the surveillance
reported that they felt that “appearing Muslim” would subject them to
law enforcement attention and, as such, they sometimes changed their
appearance and how they practiced their religion.208 The Third Circuit
later found the City of New York’s argument that it did not violate the

200. Id.
201. Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 147, 181
(2014).
202. See generally MUSLIM AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES COAL. ET AL., MAPPING MUSLIMS: NYPD
SPYING AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN MUSLIMS (2013), https://www.law.cuny.edu/wpcontent/uploads/page-assets/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/MappingMuslims.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FCX-S7KZ] [hereinafter MAPPING MUSLIMS].
203. 804 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2015).
204. MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note 202, at 10.
205. Id. at 11.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 4.
208. Id. at 15, 17.
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Muslim plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights unpersuasive and dismissed
the argument.209
4.

Narrow tailoring
Requiring that a government classification is sufficiently narrowly
tailored ensures that “the means chosen ‘fit’ th[e] compelling goal so
closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the
classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.”210 When
deciding whether a government program is narrowly tailored, courts
look to factors such as the program’s duration and flexibility; harm,
specifically to innocent third parties, that the program causes; and the
efficacy of “neutral” alternatives.211
First, the Court has held that a program making a suspect classification
may not be sufficiently narrowly tailored if it lacks durational limitations.212
Additionally, to be considered narrowly tailored, a program should be
flexible so as to treat those affected as individuals, rather than as a
category of individuals.213 A program may be overly rigid if it “erect[s]
race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public decisionmaking.”214
Second, a program may not be sufficiently narrowly tailored if there
is an impermissible degree of harm inflicted on “innocent” third parties
that “impose[s] the entire burden” of a program’s effects “on particular
individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives.”215 Harm
need not be physical or material; importantly, the Supreme Court has
held that “non-material injuries” can cause the harm necessary to
209. Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that
a lack of subjective animus of NYPD against the Muslim plaintiffs was not sufficient to
overcome the claim of a violation of the First Amendment).
210. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (alteration in original)
(emphasis added) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989) (plurality opinion)).
211. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (plurality opinion); see also
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339–42.
212. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (holding that “race-conscious [university]
admissions policies must be limited in time”); Paradise, 480 U.S. at 183 (holding that
an affirmative action program was narrowly tailored because its race-based
classifications were temporary).
213. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309 (reasoning that an affirmative action program was
sufficiently flexible because it did not “make[] race or ethnicity the defining feature”
of admissions decisions).
214. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493.
215. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(reasoning that a preferential-layoffs scheme was not sufficiently narrowly tailored
because it placed “too intrusive” a burden on non-minority employees).
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establish a constitutional violation.216 As early as the nineteenth
century in the case of Strauder v. West Virginia,217 the Court recognized
that singling individuals out based on their race was “practically a
brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority.”218
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have recognized reinforcement of
stereotypes, feelings of inferiority, and stigmatization as harms
violating the Equal Protection Clause.219 Cognizable injuries under the
Equal Protection Clause are not merely the denial of some benefit.220
The harm can manifest as discrimination and microaggressions against
the classified group, the internalization of stigmas and anxiety by
individuals, and the inability of individuals to participate in a
community with others.221
Third, courts may determine a program is not sufficiently narrowly
tailored if there are effective, “neutral” alternatives that would allow for
216. See William D. Araiza, No Cake for You: Discrimination, Dignity, and Refusals to
Serve, 19 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 115, 119 (2018) (arguing that “a
concern with non-material harms pervades the Supreme Court’s . . . discrimination
jurisprudence . . . since the early years of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
217. 100 U.S. 303 (1879), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
218. Id. at 308 (striking down a law prohibiting African Americans from jury
service).
219. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (reasoning that the
prohibition of same-sex marriage “impose[d] stigma and injury” and “demean[ed]”
same-sex couples in a constitutionally impermissible way); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 728 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing
that “[t]he danger of stigma and stirred animosities” is present in “religious linedrawing”); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (1993) (explaining that the “reinforc[ing]
[of] racial stereotypes” was a cognizable injury distinct from vote dilution); Columbus
Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 509 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that “stigma and other harm[s]” inflicted by racially-motivated
government classifications “offend the Constitution”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 494 (1954) (famously reasoning that segregation in public schools “generate[d]
a feeling of inferiority as to [children’s] status in the community”); see also R.A.
Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
803, 836 (2004) (suggesting that racial stigma is “an injury that prevents the
stigmatized individual and the group with which they are identified from fully
belonging to, and participating in, our society”).
220. See, e.g., Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (arguing that an injury for the purposes of
standing in Equal Protection cases may be the “denial of equal treatment resulting
from the imposition of [a] barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit”
itself).
221. See Lenhardt, supra note 219, at 836, 839, 844 (arguing that between the two
poles of group harm and individual harm, there exists “citizenship harm” that impedes
individuals’ abilities to participate in society).

2026

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1989

the government to further its compelling interest without making suspect
classifications.222 In other words, the state cannot choose “the way of
greater interference” if there are reasonable and less burdensome ways
to achieve its goal.223
5.

Religion under the Equal Protection Clause
The Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized religion as a
classification protected under the Equal Protection Clause.224 Most
often, cases concerning the violation of religious freedoms are evaluated
through the lens of the Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause225
of the First Amendment.226 However, this Comment is not alone in
arguing that religion should be—and in practice has been—a
classification defended by the Fourteenth Amendment.227

222. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (plurality opinion). Compare
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003) (holding that a law school sufficiently
considered neutral alternatives before implementing its flexible affirmative action
program because the alternatives would require “dramatic sacrifice[s]” in the school’s
diversity and academic quality), with City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
507 (1989) (plurality opinion) (reasoning that a city’s program was not narrowly
tailored because it did not seem to consider any neutral alternatives before
implementing a race-based quota).
223. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343, 353 (1972) (holding that state
durational residence requirements for voters were not the “least restrictive means” to
prevent voter fraud and were therefore not narrowly tailored).
224. See Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 299 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Perhaps
surprisingly, neither our Court nor the Supreme Court has considered whether
classifications based on religious affiliation trigger heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause.”); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the
Equal Protection Clause: Why the Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909,
911 (2013); Susan Gellman & Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal
Protection Clause for Religion Cases (Not Just the Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
665, 666 (2008).
225. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”).
226. See Chon & Arzt, supra note 196, at 218–19 (“In the U.S., the law of religious
freedom has been compartmentalized into a narrow First Amendment box. Relatively
few cases have explored religious tolerance via the intersection of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.”).
227. See, e.g., Gellman & Looper-Friedman, supra note 224, at 666 (calling on courts
to employ the Equal Protection Clause in cases where government actions interfere
with or coerce religious practice); Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the
Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 311, 331 (1986) (arguing the Establishment Clause Lemon test can be
“revamped” into a workable approach based on the Equal Protection Clause).
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The Supreme Court has combined Equal Protection language and
frameworks with classifications pertaining to religion on multiple
occasions.228 Justice Stone, in his famous Footnote Four in United States
v. Carolene Products Co.,229 stated that heightened scrutiny should be
employed in cases of classification of “particular religious, . . . national,
or racial minorities.”230 The Footnote further states that “prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities” could warrant a “more searching
judicial inquiry” when that prejudice “tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities.”231 In other words, “discrete and insular minorities”
are groups that have tended to be isolated or disenfranchised politically
and have been made scapegoats by the majority.232
Justice Stone furthered the notion that the Equal Protection Clause
should protect religious minorities in his dissent in Minersville School
District v. Gobitis two years later,233 where the Supreme Court ruled
against Jehovah’s Witnesses claiming that the state violated their rights
through a law requiring public school students to say the pledge of
allegiance.234 In his dissent, Justice Stone cited his Footnote Four in
Carolene Products Co. and argued that the discrimination at hand
“seem[ed] . . . no less than the surrender of the constitutional
protection of the liberty of small minorities to the popular will.”235

228. See, e.g., Morris Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Freedom from Religion
Found., 139 S. Ct. 909, 909 (2019) (asserting that governmental discrimination against
religious persons, organizations, and speech violates the Free Exercise Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per
curiam) (emphasis added) (explaining that rational basis review applies to an Equal
Protection claim unless the classification “is drawn upon inherently suspect
distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage”); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 696
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (opining that the neutral application of the
Establishment Clause “requires an equal protection mode of analysis”); see also
Paulsen, supra note 227, at 327 (noting that the Supreme Court has tended to use
Equal Protection language in religion cases, but does not apply its methodology).
229. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
230. Id. at 152–53 n.4 (citations omitted); see also Calabresi & Salander, supra note
224, at 919.
231. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4 (emphasis added).
232. Aviam Soifer, On Being Overly Discrete and Insular: Involuntary Groups and the
Anglo-American Judicial Tradition, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 381, 391 (1991).
233. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943).
234. Id. at 591–92.
235. Id. at 606 (Stone, J., dissenting).
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Additionally, on their own, the Establishment Clause and Free
Expression Clause are inadequate to fully protect religious minorities.
First Amendment protections, while useful in protecting individual
religious freedoms, are less effective when used to protect on the
grounds of group religious discrimination.236 Judicial tests measuring
Establishment Clause violations center around “proselytization, coercion,
religious purpose, or entanglement of government and religion—not
on equality.”237 Being a member of a religious group—or a perceived
member of that group—may make one vulnerable to discrimination
even when not engaging in the performative aspects of one’s faith. For
example, since September 11, 2001, Arabs, Muslims, South Asians, and
others who appear “Middle Eastern” have faced more traffic stops than
before, are frequently profiled at airports, and are increasingly
monitored in operating their businesses.238 American Muslims are
more likely to be afforded adequate protection and remedies if the law
treats discrimination against them on the basis of a suspect class rather
than solely on the basis of exercising religion.239
Further, some minorities’ religious affiliations have been racialized,
making them akin to immutable characteristics.240 Immutability is not
a condition precedent for an equal protection violation but may be
taken into consideration when determining whether a classification is

236. See Chon & Arzt, supra note 196, at 220, 247 (“[M]inority religious affiliation
can lead to group discrimination, particularly when the cultural distinctiveness of the
minority religion is perceived as threatening to the majority.”); Gellman & LooperFriedman, supra note 224, at 668 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause, designed . . . to
address disparate treatment by the government, is a better tool for the job of analyzing
a government religious expression case than an Establishment Clause ‘retrofitted’ to
reach these religious equality issues.”).
237. Gellman & Looper-Friedman, supra note 224, at 672.
238. AMNESTY INT’L, THREAT AND HUMILIATION: RACIAL PROFILING, DOMESTIC
SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 5, 8, 15 (2004),
https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/rp_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9P7L-NMGT].
239. See Gellman & Looper-Friedman, supra note 224, at 702 (arguing that in cases
of religious discrimination, the Equal Protection Clause “speaks to the harm that is
actually suffered”).
240. See Chon & Arzt, supra note 196, at 228 (“Like most aspects of culture,
[religion] is connected to ancestry in that family and community often influence or
direct children’s religious choices.”). Racialization of religion is the process by which
“certain phenotypical features associated with an ethnic group and attached to race . . .
become associated with the religion.” See Khyati Y. Joshi, The Racialization of Hinduism,
Islam, and Sikhism in the United States, 39 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE EDUC. 211, 216 (2006).
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suspect.241 As stated above, whether a classification is suspect can be
measured by a history of societal discrimination or political powerlessness,
the presence of a discrete and insular minority,242 and immutability.243
However, courts have recognized that the term “immutable” should not
always be taken literally for Equal Protection purposes; rather it
encompasses characteristics that are so fundamental to one’s identity
that one should not be compelled to change it.244 Religious belief is
not immutable in the literal sense; one can certainly convert to another
religion or renounce any religious affiliations altogether. However,
religious beliefs are considered so deeply connected with one’s identity
and fundamental to constitutional rights that they should be treated as
an immutable characteristic.245 As such, courts should view classification
on the basis of religion, especially that of a “discrete and insular
minorit[y],” as suspect and subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.246
II.

ANALYSIS

Government-funded CVE programs in the Twin Cities threaten the
Equal Protection rights of Minnesotan Somalis because, as implemented,

241. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.3.2
(2d ed. 2002) (noting that other factors indicating whether a classification is suspect
include whether there is a history of societal discrimination and political powerlessness
or a discrete and insular minority).
242. See supra notes 229–32 and accompanying text (noting that prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may prevent those minorities from accessing political
processes needed to protect themselves from prejudice).
243. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
244. Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 301–02 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Baskin
v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 2014) (describing an immutable characteristic as
one that requires “a deep psychological commitment” such as religious belief and is
distinct from a characteristic that is easy to change, such as the “length of his or her
fingernails”); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring) (“It is clear that by ‘immutability’ the [Supreme] Court has never meant
strict immutability in the sense that members of the class must be physically unable to
change or mask the trait.”). Similarly, in the immigration and asylum law context, an
immutable characteristic is not literally something that cannot be changed; rather, it
includes characteristics that a person “should not be required to change because [they
are] fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.” Matter of Acosta, 19 I.
& N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985), overruled in part by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
245. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726 (Norris, J., concurring) (noting that the Supreme
Court treats traits as “immutable” if altering that trait would “involve great difficulty,
such as requiring a major physical change or a traumatic change of identity”).
246. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
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the programs cannot survive strict scrutiny. First, CVE programs
involve state action and thereby trigger the Equal Protection Clause.
Second, the programs classify Somalis both facially and as applied.
Third, CVE initiatives should be evaluated under the standard of strict
scrutiny because they classify Minnesotan Somalis on the bases of
national origin and religion and infringe on their fundamental First
Amendment rights. Finally, as implemented, CVE programs in the
Twin Cities do not meet strict scrutiny because they are not sufficiently
narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest.
A.

CVE Programs, Including in the Twin Cities, Involve Government
Action at the Federal, State, and Local Levels.

For an Equal Protection violation to occur, there must first be a
government action. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies directly to states’ actions.247 The due process
protections of the Fifth Amendment apply the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection standards to federal government actions.248
The federal government spearheads CVE programs in the United
States and therefore must abide by Equal Protection principles.249 The
White House, along with several executive branch agencies, laid out its
approach to CVE in its Strategic Implementation Plan and repeatedly
mentions the federal government agencies’ role in the programs.250
The plan states that one of its objectives is to “enhanc[e] Federal
engagement with and support to local communities that may be
targeted by violent extremists.”251 The FBI,252 NCTC,253 DHS,254 and
DOJ,255 among others, have all implemented CVE activities pursuant to
the Strategic Implementation Plan.

247. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954).
248. See supra note 182.
249. See supra Sections I.A.1–2.
250. 2011 STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 9, at 1, 3.
251. Id. at 7.
252. See supra notes 41–52 and accompanying text (discussing the FBI’s
“preventative framework” to counter “violent Islamic extremism”).
253. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text (explaining NCTC’s CVE Guide,
which instructs government workers on evaluating extremism “risk factors”).
254. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text (examining DHS’s CVE Grant
Program for implementing CVE activities).
255. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (surveying DOJ’s allocation of CVE
program grants).
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All levels of government, as well as the private sector through
government funding, have had a hand in CVE efforts in the Twin
Cities. The U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota designed and
implemented the CVE pilot program in the Twin Cities.256 The FBI257
and local law enforcement258 have participated in engaging the Somali
community for the purposes of countering violent extremism. DHS is
involved through its grant program funding the Hennepin County
Sheriff’s Office and Heartland Democracy Center, as well as through
the roundtables it holds.259 Minneapolis public schools participate in
CVE initiatives that monitor Somali students for signs of “radicalization.”260
All of these government actors, whether at the federal or state level, must
therefore abide by the standards set forth in the Equal Protection
Clause and are subject to its prohibitions when making impermissible
classifications.
B.

CVE Programs Classify Somalis in the Twin Cities Both Facially
and As Applied.

A government classification may be made on its face where the
government explicitly singles out a group for different treatment.261
Alternatively, a classification may exist as applied if the government
uses facially neutral language as a pretext obscuring a discriminatory
purpose.262 CVE programs make classifications of Minnesotan Somalis
both facially and as applied.

256. See supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text (discussing FBI’s “Specialized
Community Outreach Teams” in Minneapolis).
258. See supra notes 108–13, 119–20 and accompanying text (discussing, for
example, local law enforcement’s partnership with the federal government in the
African Immigrant Muslim Coordinated Outreach Program (AIMCOP)).
259. See supra notes 118–19, 122 and accompanying text. While the Equal Protection
Clause itself does not apply to private entities, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
states that “[n]o person . . . shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, . . .
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (emphasis added). Thus, even though Heartland
Democracy is not itself a government actor, it is still subject to similar prohibitions of
discrimination since it receives federal funding from DHS.
260. See supra notes 124–29 and accompanying text (discussing, for example,
Hennepin County school districts’ Be@School program).
261. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text.
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1.

Facial classifications
CVE initiatives in the Twin Cities often explicitly identify the Somali
community as their target.263 The U.S. Attorney for the District of
Minnesota created a framework for the pilot program that identifies
Minnesotan Somalis as its focus in the first sentence.264 This mirrored
DOJ’s initial announcement of the pilot program identifying the
Somali community in the Twin Cities explicitly and exclusively for
engagement in its CVE program.265 Other government actors in the
Twin Cities have followed suit, explicitly identifying the Somali
community as the focus of CVE.266 In these instances, the government
has made facial classifications that explicitly single out Minnesotan
Somalis for different treatment than other Americans.
2.

As-applied classifications
A classification that is facially race-neutral may still be subject to strict
scrutiny if the classification, as applied, is an “obvious pretext for racial
discrimination” and is shown to be motivated by a discriminatory
intent.267 Showing the disproportionate impact of a facially neutral
state action is “an important starting point” to show discriminatory
intent.268 CVE programs disproportionately impact American Muslims;
American Muslims make up just over one percent of the U.S.
population,269 but the vast majority of CVE programs in the United
States target them as a group.270 Somalis make up 0.9 percent of the
263. See, e.g., BUILDING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE, supra note 13, at 2 (identifying the
recruitment of Minnesotan Somalis specifically by terrorist organizations); Pilot
Programs, supra note 87 (explicitly and exclusively referring to the Minnesotan Somali
community in the announcement of the CVE pilot programs).
264. BUILDING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE, supra note 13, at 2 (“Minnesota is home to
the largest number of Somali immigrants in the United States.”).
265. Pilot Programs, supra note 87; see also Mauleón, supra note 126, at 1354 (“The
official strategic plans for CVE at the federal and local level begin with preambles
which avoid naming Muslims as a specific threat, then proceed to exclusively elaborate
on perceived threats in Muslim communities.”).
266. See, e.g., EFFECTIVENESS OF GRANTS PROGRAM, supra note 120, at 21, 23 (reporting
to Congress that DHS’s grants to Heartland Democracy Center and the Hennepin
County Sheriff’s Office went toward projects “focus[ing] on ISIS, Al-Shabaab, and
other Islamist terrorist movements, most often targeting Somali-American youth”);
Sperber, supra note 104 (noting the U.S. Attorney’s creation of the Somali American
Task Force).
267. See supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
269. Mohamed, supra note 150.
270. See supra Section I.A.
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population in Minnesota, yet most CVE programs in the state target
them.271
However, disproportionate impact alone is not enough to establish
an Equal Protection violation. The classification must be shown to be
tied to a discriminatory purpose or intent.272 Proving discriminatory
intent requires showing that the government actor meant to single out
someone on the basis of that protected characteristic, though it does
not require showing a malicious motive behind the classification.273
Many of the implementers of CVE programs in the United States,
including in the Twin Cities, have good intentions and want to provide
crucial social services to the populations they work with.274 Nevertheless,
the implementers’ intentional targeting of Somalis in the Twin Cities,
even if motivated by good intentions, requires the classification to meet
the strict scrutiny standard.
Discriminatory intent can be proven through an analysis of the
totality of the circumstances, namely through variations of the substantive
or procedural status quo.275 In addition to analyzing disproportionate
impact, the court should examine the historical background of the
decision, the specific sequence of events leading up to the decision,
and the legislative or administrative history of the government actor.276

271. MINN. STATE DEMOGRAPHIC CTR., supra note 90, at 8.
272. See supra note 186–88 and accompanying text.
273. Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 297–98 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Snyder
v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 485 (2008)) (holding that intentional discrimination of
Muslim plaintiffs by NYPD did not require NYPD to be “motivated by ‘ill will, enmity,
or hostility’” to violate the Equal Protection Clause).
274. See, e.g., “About Us,” KA JOOG, https://www.kajoog.org/about-us
[https://perma.cc/P4PX-S4X8] (explaining the Somali nonprofit’s mission of
“creat[ing] a better world by providing community-based, culturally specific programs
and services to Somali youth and their famil[ies]”); Nadim Houry, Trump’s CVE
Program: Going from Bad to Worse, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/37866/good-vs-bad-extremists
[https://perma.cc/KL2D-UCXB]. Many CVE programs, especially those that nongovernmental organizations provide, are well meaning and provide important
community-level social services and funding opportunities. However, critics contend
that the “feel-good intentions of CVE cease . . . when the framework assumes the latent
criminality of an entire community.” Mauleón, supra note 126, at 1369–70; see also
Nabeela Barbari, Reconsidering CVE: The Unintended Consequences of Countering Violent
Extremism Efforts in America 75 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL (Dec. 2018) (unpublished
Master’s thesis), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=821438 [https://perma.cc/U7AEBRKY].
275. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977).
276. Id. at 267–68.
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For example, the White House’s National Strategy referenced Islamic
terrorism and al-Qaeda, indicating a focus on this “brand” of
extremism motivating the programs.277 Furthermore, under the
Trump Administration, evidence that CVE programs are specifically
targeting American Muslims has grown even more apparent. The
Administration has considered rebranding the program as “Countering
Islamic Extremism”278 and rescinded a CVE grant given to a nonprofit
dedicated to de-radicalizing right-wing extremists.279 Therefore, even for
CVE programs that are facially neutral, there is significant evidence to
suggest they are still discriminatory as applied.
C.

The Constitutionality of CVE Programs in the Twin Cities Should
Be Reviewed Under the Standard of Strict Scrutiny.

Courts must evaluate government classifications under the standard
of strict scrutiny when the classification is based on either a suspect
class or the infringement of a fundamental right.280 CVE programs in
the Twin Cities require strict scrutiny analysis first because the
programs classify Somalis on the bases of their national origin and religion,
both of which, this Comment argues, are suspect classes.281 Second, CVE
programs impermissibly infringe on Somalis’ First Amendment rights.282
1. CVE programs target the Somali community as suspect classes based on
national origin and religion.
A classification is based on a suspect class when it “classifies by race,
alienage, or national origin.”283 As discussed above, federal, state, and
local governments are classifying the Somali community in the Twin
277. EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 8, at 1.
278. See Ainsley, supra note 66 (describing the Trump Administration’s
consideration of changing “Countering Violent Extremism” to “Countering Islamic
Extremism” or “Countering Radical Islamic Extremism”).
279. Editorial Board, Trump’s Homeland Security Department Gives Right-Wing Extremists
a Pass, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
trumps-homeland-security-department-gives-right-wing-extremists-apass/2017/08/31/a0164ab4-8455-11e7-ab27-1a21a8e006ab_story.html
[https://perma.cc/6FL4-E9DQ].
280. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.
281. See infra Section II.C.1 (discussing how Somalis, and American Muslims
generally, are discrete and insular minorities in the United States).
282. See infra Section II.C.2 (discussing the chilling effects of CVE programs on
American Muslims’ practicing and associating with Islam).
283. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(emphasis added).
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Cities on the grounds that they are from Somalia or of Somalian
ancestry (i.e., their national origin).284
Because Minnesotan Somalis, and American Muslims generally, are
“discrete and insular minorit[ies],” government policies classifying
them should receive heightened scrutiny. American Muslims have
experienced “violence, discrimination, defamation and intolerances”
for their 100-year history in the United States.285 After the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, discrimination, harassment, and abuse
of Muslims (or individuals perceived as being Muslim) skyrocketed.286
The prejudice against Somalis in the Twin Cities—in this case, through
the implementation of discriminatory CVE programs—“tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes” that they should
be able to rely upon to protect them as a minority.287 Heightened and
targeted law enforcement surveillance, infiltration of community
activities, and monitoring in public schools all impermissibly impact
American Somalis’ safety and religious freedom.288
As discussed above, the Equal Protection Clause does not explicitly
recognize religion as a protected classification.289 However, American
Muslims, including those in the Somali community in the Twin Cities,
could plausibly claim that the government classifies them based on
their religious affiliation and that the classification is one that the
Equal Protection Clause protects.
First, the Supreme Court has used Equal Protection language and
frameworks in examining classifications pertaining to religion.290 As
suggested by Justice Stone in Footnote Four, heightened scrutiny should
be employed in evaluating the validity of classifications of religious
minorities, such as American Muslims.291 In the 2015 case Hassan v. City
284. See supra notes 262–64 and accompanying text.
285. Amaney Jamal, Civil Liberties and the Otherization of Arab and Muslim Americans,
in RACE AND ARAB AMERICANS BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11: FROM INVISIBLE CITIZENS TO
VISIBLE SUBJECTS 114, 115 (Amaney Jamal & Nadine Naber, eds., 2008).
286. See, e.g., Kristin Moyé Pruszynski, Living in a Post 9/11 World: Religious
Discrimination Against Muslims, 2 PHX. L. REV. 361, 363–64 (2009) (explaining that less
than a week after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Council on American-Islamic
Relations (CAIR) had received over 300 reports of harassment and abuse, half the
number of reports CAIR had received in the entire prior year).
287. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
288. See supra Section I.A.2 (noting the concentration of CVE programs in the
Somali community, particularly in the Twin Cities).
289. See Gellman & Looper-Friedman, supra note 224, at 666–67.
290. See supra notes 228–35 and accompanying text.
291. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4.
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of New York,292 the Third Circuit held that police surveillance of
American Muslim communities under the guise of counterterrorism
and national security violated the Equal Protection Clause, given the
discrimination based on religious affiliation.293 The CVE programs in the
Twin Cities are similarly discriminatory on the basis of religion and
should be subject to strict scrutiny analysis under Equal Protection
principles.
Second, the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses alone may not be adequate to protect American Muslims as a
religious minority.294 Freedom to practice religion is a clearly protected
constitutional right, but, in the context of discrimination against
American Muslims as a group, the “focus is not the individual right to
practice Islam.”295 The Fourteenth Amendment is needed to protect
“the right to claim freedom from discrimination based on group
religious affiliation.”296 CVE programs in the Twin Cities not only target
Somalis in their places of worship or in other religious contexts; the
programs engage and monitor Somalis in their public schools,297 in
their interactions with law enforcement,298 and at community
gatherings.299 Additionally, Muslim plaintiffs have struggled to win Free
Exercise violation claims in court; research suggests that Christian
plaintiffs are more likely to win cases based on Free Exercise violations
than plaintiffs of other faiths in U.S. Courts of Appeals.300
Third, in the context of American Muslims, including in the Twin
Cities, religion, national origin, and race are conflated in a way that
should make religion viewed as an immutable characteristic and thereby

292. 804 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2015).
293. Id. at 299 (reasoning that the Supreme Court has long implied that religion
should be treated like other classifications subject to heightened scrutiny); see also
Gonzalez, supra note 132, at 5–7 (providing a detailed analysis of Hassan v. City of New
York).
294. See supra notes 236–37 and accompanying text.
295. Chon, supra note 196, at 247.
296. Id.
297. See supra notes 124–29 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 108–17, 120 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
300. See James C. Brent, An Agent and Two Principals: U.S. Court of Appeals Responses
to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 27 AM. POL. Q. 236, 250–51 (1999) (explaining that “Catholic
and Protestant sects were more likely to win than were claimants who belonged to
other religions (38.9% vs. 24.5%)”).
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a suspect classification.301 While immutability is not a condition
precedent for an Equal Protection violation, courts may consider it
when determining if a classification is suspect.302 Religion is not literally
immutable in the way one’s skin color is. However, the law has
recognized religious affiliation as an immutable characteristic, viewing
it as something that individuals “ought not be compelled to change
because it is fundamental to their identities.”303 Individuals in the Twin
Cities being targeted by CVE are identified through different
“performative” aspects of their identities, such as their “names,
clothing, religious practices, political ideologies, and maintaining ties
to their home countries.”304 Being of Somali ancestry is clearly
immutable. Somalis’ decision to practice Islam or identify as Muslim is
similarly so. Somalis, or any other individual identifying as Muslim in
the United States, should not be compelled to change that fundamental
part of their identity. This immutability supports the conclusion that
Minnesotan Somalis should be regarded as a suspect class.
2. CVE programs infringe on the fundamental rights of Somalis in the Twin
Cities.
A classification can trigger heightened scrutiny if it deters the
exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed right, or if it makes the
exercise of that right substantially more difficult.305 CVE programs can
have chilling effects306 on American Muslims’ participation in and
association with Islam.307 Broadly speaking, the chilling effect on Muslims’
301. For the definition of racialization, see supra note 240. Since September 11,
2001, “Arabs” and “Muslims” have been conflated in the United States, “even though
most Arabs in America are not Muslim and most of the world’s Muslims are not Arabs.”
Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the Construction
of Race Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 33 (2002).
302. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 241, § 9.3.2.
303. Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 301–02 (3d Cir. 2015); see also supra
note 244.
304. See Mauleón, supra note 126, at 1359, 1361 (noting that what would have once
been seen as “racial or ethnic profiling is now ‘cloaked in expertise about the process
by which Muslims become terrorists’”).
305. See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
307. See Akbar, supra note 43, at 831 (explaining the so-called “Muslim exemption”
to the First Amendment); Aziz, supra note 201, at 180–82 (detailing the ways American
Muslims feel inclined to suppress their religious identities in the face of government
and law enforcement scrutiny); Khaled A. Beydoun, Acting Muslim, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 9–11 (2018) (explaining how “[a]ffirming or negating Muslim identity has
distinct implications on the free exercise of religion”); Mauleón, supra note 126, at
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exercise of their First Amendment rights manifests itself in their
“downplay[ing] [of] their religious identity” and “fear[s] [of] becoming
too active in the religious activities of a Muslim community because this
will be viewed as anti-assimilationist and indicative of terrorist
inclinations.”308 Muslims may stop praying publicly, wearing headscarves
or growing beards, or attending Muslim community events.309
While CVE programs may not include the exact intensive police
surveillance like that done by NYPD310 under the guise of
counterterrorism, the programs’ entanglement with law enforcement
likely has the same chilling effect on American Muslims’ expression of
their First Amendment rights. For example, individuals with “precarious
immigration statuses or other legal concerns” may forgo attending
mosque to avoid “the risk of . . . being featured in a police file.”311
Even if the government intends CVE programs to be more benign
than “hard” counterterrorism efforts, it is reasonable to infer that
American Muslims may refrain from engaging in their religious
practices when they see law enforcement targeting their community.
In fact, Somalis in the Twin Cities have expressed their fears of
speaking out and how they have been restrained from exercising their
First Amendment rights.312 Somali community activists wrote in the

1352 (noting that “CVE programs have been criticized for . . . the chilling effect they
have on Muslim political expression and behavior”); Romtin Parvaresh, Note, Prayer
for Relief: Anti-Muslim Discrimination as Racial Discrimination, 87 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1287,
1288 (2014) (opining that police surveillance of Muslims “chills religious participation
and casts innocent Muslims as potential terror suspects”). See generally Pinchuk, supra
note 126 (examining how the CVE program has a chilling effect on free speech and
expression); Matthew A. Wasserman, Note, First Amendment Limitations on Police
Surveillance: The Case of the Muslim Surveillance Program, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1786, 1791–92
(2015) (discussing the chilling effect of Muslim surveillance programs on free speech
and association).
308. Aziz, supra note 201, at 181.
309. Id.; see also Mauleón, supra note 126, at 1359–61 (providing examples of
“different performative aspects” of the Muslim identity used to target Muslims
captured by CVE).
310. See supra notes 202–09 and accompanying text.
311. See Wasserman, supra note 307, at 1797 (citing MAPPING MUSLIMS, supra note
202, at 14).
312. See, e.g., KUNDNANI, supra note 95, at 231; Kadra Abdi et al., The ‘Countering
Violent Extremism’ Program Institutionalizes Injustice Against Somalis, MINNPOST (May 1,
2015), https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2015/05/countering-violentextremism-program-institutionalizes-injustice-against-so
[https://perma.cc/4RD2KUTF]; Vanessa Taylor, Police Surveillance Concerns US Muslims amid BLM Protest
Crackdown,
MIDDLE
EAST
EYE
(July
3,
2020,
3:15
PM),
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online newspaper MinnPost that people in the community were afraid
to challenge the programs for fear of government retaliation.313 One
young Somali in the Twin Cities said, “[e]very Muslim in America lives
in fear.”314 These apprehensions indicate a chilling effect on Minnesotan
Somalis’ First Amendment rights and warrant a review of the
government’s CVE programs under strict scrutiny.
D.

As Implemented, CVE Programs in the Twin Cities Do Not Meet the
High Bar Set by Strict Scrutiny and Are Thereby Unconstitutional.

To survive strict scrutiny, a government classification must be narrowly
tailored to further a compelling government interest.315 Although the
nation’s security from domestic terrorism is a compelling government
interest, CVE programs in the Twin Cities are not sufficiently narrowly
tailored to further that interest and therefore do not survive strict
scrutiny.
1. National security is a compelling government interest but should be
approached with caution.
The U.S. government has a compelling interest in the nation’s security
and in preventing domestic terrorism.316 However, American history has
shown that this interest can misguidedly “sanction a discriminatory policy
motivated by animosity toward a disfavored group, all in the name of a

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-surveillance-black-lives-matter-muslimscoronavirus-pandemic [https://perma.cc/56EL-EDTC] (quoting a young Muslim
woman as arguing that the purpose of CVE programs is “[t]o instill fear in the heart
of communities and paralyse them from advocating for themselves or dissenting from
the unjust systems this country is grounded in”).
313. Kadra Abdi et al., supra note 312.
314. KUNDNANI, supra note 95, at 230.
315. See supra note 193.
316. See, e.g., Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137. S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017)
(per curiam) (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010))
(“The interest in preserving national security is ‘an urgent objective of the highest
order.’”); Gardiner Harris & Michael D. Shear, Obama Says of Terrorist Threat: “We Will
Overcome It,” N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/
07/us/politics/president-obama-terrorism-threat-speech-oval-office.html (reporting
President Barack Obama’s emphasis during an Oval Office address after a domestic
terrorism attack in California that the “threat from terrorism is real”). But see Ziglar v.
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862 (2017) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 523
(1985)) (“[N]ational-security concerns must not become a talisman used to ward off
inconvenient claims—a ‘label’ used to ‘cover a multitude of sins.’”).
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superficial claim of national security.”317 Infamously, in Korematsu v.
United States,318 the Supreme Court, acknowledging that racial
discrimination warrants strict scrutiny, held that concentration camps
for individuals of Japanese ancestry in the United States were
permissible because of the government’s duty to protect the country
in times of war.319 Rather than learn from history’s lessons about “the
danger of excessive deference to the Executive,” the War on Terror has
seen repeated “unquestioning unity with the President.”320
While the factual context of CVE programs in the Twin Cities is
obviously different from that of Korematsu, the lesson remains that
national security concerns should not give the U.S. government carte
blanche to infringe upon the rights of the law-abiding individuals within
its borders. Whatever compelling interest the government has in
preventing the radicalization of Somalis in the Twin Cities does not
immediately exempt it from recognizing the Equal Protection rights of
that population.
2. The CVE programs in the Twin Cities are not sufficiently narrowly
tailored to further the government’s interest in countering terrorism and
promoting national security.
To survive strict scrutiny, a government classification must be narrowly
tailored to further a compelling government interest.321 When deciding
whether a government program is narrowly tailored, courts will look to
factors such as the program’s duration and flexibility; harm, specifically
to innocent third parties; and the efficacy of “neutral” alternatives.322

317. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2436, 2448 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing against the majority’s decision to permit the Trump
Administration’s “Muslim ban”).
318. 323 U.S. 214 (1944), abrogated by Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2392.
319. Id. at 216, 219–20; cf. id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Such exclusion goes
over ‘the very brink of constitutional power,’ and falls into the ugly abyss of racism.”).
See generally Stephanie Howell, In the Shadow of Korematsu: Precedent & Policy
Considerations for Trump’s Muslim Registry, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 593, 596 (2018)
(comparing Korematsu’s history with Trump’s Muslim ban with similarities in national
security arguments).
320. See Joo, supra note 301, at 44 (citing the Bush Administration’s expansion of
power with little Congressional resistance in the immediate aftermath of September
11, most notably with the USA PATRIOT Act).
321. See supra note 193.
322. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (plurality opinion).
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a. CVE programs are overly broad in terms of their duration and
flexibility.
First, the programs’ lack of a clear end date and their overbroad
reach indicate the programs are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to
further the government’s interest. The Supreme Court has often held
that programs making race-based classifications were not narrowly
tailored when they lacked durational limitation.323 Here, the
government never designed CVE efforts with a clear end date or goal
in mind. The War on Terror itself has been criticized for its neverending scope because it is “impossible to defeat an ideological
movement militarily.”324 Similarly, deradicalization theory focuses on
preventing the development of certain extremist ideologies, which
many have suggested is unrealistic.325 While this fact alone does not
automatically make the programs unconstitutional, it indicates that
they may not be sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny.
Additionally, CVE programs are implemented inflexibly in that they
are applied largely on the basis of one’s ancestry, national origin, or
religion,326 making these suspect characteristics the “sole criterion in
an aspect of public decisionmaking.”327 Many of the programs operate
on the misguided assumption that there is a “fixed, singular entity
called Somali culture which could be an object of police knowledge.”328
With the underlying aim of “develop[ing] a baseline profile of Somali
individuals that are vulnerable to being radicalized or participating in
extremist activities,”329 law enforcement and CVE programs target tens
of thousands of people merely for sharing the same ancestry as a
couple of dozen individuals who joined an extremist organization
overseas.330

323. See supra note 212.
324. The War on Terror has been criticized as one that is never-ending and
impossible to win. See, e.g., Katherine Zimmerman, The Never-Ending War on Terror: Why
the U.S. Keeps Fighting the Wrong Battle, FOREIGN AFF. (May 11, 2018, 12:00 AM),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-05-11/never-ending-war-terror
[https://perma.cc/B5LC-DJLJ].
325. See supra notes 22, 135–43 and accompanying text.
326. See supra Section II.C (noting the need for a higher standard of scrutiny when
classifications include suspect classes).
327. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion).
328. KUNDNANI, supra note 95, at 220.
329. SCOT Communication, supra note 114, at 5.
330. See Mauleón, supra note 126, at 1351 (positing that CVE is “based upon the
premise that certain populations are at risk for breeding terrorists”).
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The rigidity with which CVE programs identify their “beneficiaries”
ends up casting a net that is both too wide and too narrow. A Somali
community organizer in the Twin Cities said that the indicators
employed by CVE programs were flawed and missed the targets they
intended to capture: “In fact, I could be a friend of a radicalized
individual and never have to know. Which . . . actually [happened]. I
never knew they were radicalized until they left and did what they
did.”331 On the other end of the spectrum, it is unlikely the Twin Cities’
CVE programs, even if they were effective, would have picked up on
Troy Kastigar, a young white man who grew up in the suburbs,
converted to Islam, and later left to fight for al-Shabaab.332 The
programs, as implemented, almost certainly would not have identified
and “de-radicalized” the three men from the racist, anti-government
White Rabbit militia who bombed the Dar Al-Farooq Islamic Center
outside Minneapolis in 2017.333
b. CVE programs in the Twin Cities impermissibly harm tens of
thousands of innocent Somalis.
Second, the CVE programs impermissibly harm the tens of
thousands of nonviolent Somalis who are associated with criminality
simply because of their ancestry and religious affiliation. When evaluating
the constitutionality of government programs making suspect
classifications, courts must consider the harms inflicted on innocent
third parties.334 A program is not sufficiently narrowly tailored when the
effect of the actions purportedly furthering the government’s
compelling interest “impose the entire burden . . . on particular
individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives.”335 Harm
need not be physical or material; the reinforcement of stereotypes and
perpetuation of feelings of inferiority and stigmatization are cognizable
injuries under Equal Protection jurisprudence.336
The chilling effect CVE programs have on American Muslims has
been tangible, as Sahar Aziz poignantly summarized:
As a consequence [of CVE surveillance], Muslims are pressured to
downplay their religious identity while attempting to assimilate by
331. KUNDNANI, supra note 95, at 229.
332. Id. at 211.
333. See supra note 156 (discussing new CVE branding tactics by the Trump
Administration that would continue to foster fear without successful results).
334. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171, 183 (1987) (plurality opinion).
335. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986) (plurality opinion).
336. See supra notes 216, 219.
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adopting local accents, remaining deferential and cheerful in the
face of government targeting, and engaging in hyper-patriotic acts
such as displaying American flags in their homes and businesses. In
addition, they fear becoming too active in the religious activities of
a Muslim community because this will be viewed as anti-assimilationist
and indicative of terrorist inclinations. Muslims cease engaging in
identity performance expressed through public prayer, wearing
headscarves, attending Muslim community events, or other activities
that foster a Muslim group identity.337

In addition to inflicting a significant chilling effect on American
Muslims, CVE programs legitimize discrimination of Muslims by
“reinforc[ing] that Muslims are a suspect community.”338 Since
September 11, 2001, those perceived as Muslim or “Middle Eastern”
have been deemed suspicious and faced increasing discrimination in
traffic stops, at airports, and in operating their businesses.339 American
Muslims have faced increasing hate crimes, including “arsons at
mosques, assaults, shootings, and threats of violence.”340 Somalis in the
Twin Cities have been the victims of harassment, assault, and domestic
terrorist attacks.341
Even in the absence of “tangible” harms, of which there have
certainly been many, CVE programs, when implemented in a way that
solely targets a community based on their national origin or religion,
are a harmful “brand upon them, affixed by the law.”342 Minnesotan
Somalis are forced to bear the burden of ineffective programs that
impermissibly target them on the basis of their national origin and
religion.
c. There are effective and less harmful alternatives to CVE programs.
Finally, the government has effective alternatives in countering
radicalization in the Twin Cities. In determining whether a program is
sufficiently narrowly tailored, courts will evaluate whether there are
effective, “neutral” alternatives that allow for the government to
further its compelling interest without making suspect classifications

337. Aziz, supra note 201, at 181.
338. Id. at 211.
339. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
340. Lichtblau, supra note 154.
341. Id.; see supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text.
342. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (holding that
prohibiting African Americans from jury service was an impermissible “assertion of
their inferiority”), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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or infringing on fundamental rights.343 Especially in light of the
ineffectiveness of the methodology behind CVE and radicalization
theory,344 there are a number of alternatives that could be more
effective in preventing violent extremism.
First, the government, especially law enforcement, should focus on
targeted intelligence gathering and normal, fact-driven police work
that pursues individuals actually suspected of criminal activity. This can
include untangling connections of known terrorist networks and
investigating tips of genuinely suspicious activity.345 The Institute of
Homeland Security Solutions confirmed that more than eighty
percent of the foiled terrorist plots against the United States between
1999 and 2009 were discovered “via observations from law enforcement
or the general public.”346 The study concluded that more “basic processes,
such as ensuring that investigative leads are properly pursued” were
important and more effective than misguided preventative measures.347
In addition to ensuring that the rights of American Muslims are not
being impermissibly violated, widening and shifting the focus of
counterterrorism back to effective, fact-driven law enforcement will
allow for mechanisms that capture all forms of violent extremism,
including the most prevalent form: domestic terrorism by right-wing
extremists.348
Second, any efforts to address the social conditions that may make
individuals vulnerable to radicalization should be truly led by the
communities they are a part of. Despite the lip service paid to
“community engagement,” the “federal government has repeatedly
signaled little room for American Muslim communities to play a
determinative role in setting priorities” of CVE programs.349 Law
enforcement in the Twin Cities has continued to assume a predominant
role in community-driven initiatives, despite the fact that only about
eight percent of Minneapolis police officers actually live in the Twin
Cities.350 Preventative programs should be left to civil society
343. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (plurality opinion).
344. See supra Section I.A.3 (addressing racialization and stigmatization of American
Muslims as the foundation with inconsistent results of such CVE programs).
345. PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 43, at 36.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
349. Akbar, supra note 112, at 893.
350. Libor Jany, Only About 8 Percent of Minneapolis Police Officers Live in City Limits,
STAR TRIB. (Aug. 24, 2017, 7:29 AM), https://www.startribune.com/few-minneapolis-
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organizations and social service providers that have the trust of the
community and can serve the community outside of the counterterrorism
context.351 Law enforcement should not be involved in these spaces as it
breaks the trust of the community and disincentivizes people who may
be seeking help from doing so because they are afraid of being handed
over to the police before they have ever actually engaged in criminal
activity.352 Community organization leaders in the Twin Cities have
emphasized a need for “a civic infrastructure” and youth engagement.353
Although activities working toward these broader goals may prevent
terrorism and radicalization, it is crucial that the activities not be tied
to these terms so as to avoid stigmatization and to provide the
communities with social services they need.
Given the availability of neutral, effective alternatives, as well as the
overbroad and injurious nature of many CVE programs as implemented,
there is a clear lack of the narrow tailoring required for a government
classification to survive strict scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
CVE programs, as implemented, violate the Equal Protection rights
of the Somali community in the Twin Cities because the government
makes impermissible facial and as-applied classifications on the basis
of national origin and religion. These classifications are not sufficiently
narrowly tailored to further the government’s interest in preventing
violent extremism. Even though they may be well-intentioned, the
programs designate the community as inherently suspect, chill
American Muslims from exercising their freedoms, and legitimatize
discrimination and harassment. Instead, the government, especially
law enforcement, should use traditional, legal, fact-driven policing
measures to pursue suspects of terrorism that have actually engaged in

cops-live-inside-city-limits/441581413/?refresh=true [https://perma.cc/W37RNCLX].
351. See ABBAS BARZEGAR ET AL., CIVIC APPROACHES TO CONFRONTING VIOLENT
EXTREMISM 15 (2016), https://tcv.gsu.edu/files/2016/09/Civic-Approaches-Sept-82016-Digital-Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/KA5H-PMUH] (arguing that effective
CVE “requires a shift away from asking, expecting, or compelling local religious and
civil society actors from serving as monitors and informants for law enforcement”).
352. Id.
353. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 114 (“Although [community groups] might
contribute to achieving goals of terrorism prevention, neither the organizations nor
the people they serve necessarily see what they do as having anything to do with
terrorism.”).
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criminality. This approach would create space for communities to truly
take the lead in identifying their needs and the vulnerabilities, if any,
their community members have to extremist recruitment.

